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THE  SUPREME  COURT  BAR  AT  THE
BAR OF PATENTS
Paul R. Gugliuzza*
Over the past two decades, a few dozen lawyers have come to dominate practice before the
U.S. Supreme Court.  By many accounts, these elite lawyers—whose clients are often among the
largest corporations in the world—have spurred the Court to hear more cases that businesses care
about and to decide those cases in favor of their clients.  The Supreme Court’s recent caselaw on
antitrust, arbitration, punitive damages, class actions, and more provides copious examples.
Though it is often overlooked in discussions of the emergent Supreme Court bar, patent law
is another area in which the Court’s agenda has changed significantly in the past twenty years.
After rarely hearing patent cases for several decades, the Court now decides three or more patent
cases nearly every Term.  This Article presents an empirical analysis linking the Supreme Court’s
increasing interest in patent law to the elite bar’s growing involvement in patent litigation.
Though correlation does not prove causation, the Article relies on a novel dataset of cert petitions
in Federal Circuit patent cases to suggest that the elite bar has, in fact, contributed to the growth
of the Supreme Court’s patent docket.  Among this Article’s key findings is that, in patent cases, a
cert petition filed by an elite lawyer is three times more likely to be granted than a petition filed by
a lawyer outside that group.  And although elite lawyers account for only 16% of cert petitions
filed in patent cases, their petitions account for a remarkable 40% of the petitions granted.
Because patent appeals are centralized in the Federal Circuit, patent law lacks the circuit
splits that the law clerks who sift through cert petitions would normally look for in recommending
that the Court grant review.  But the presence of elite lawyers may not be an ideal proxy for
certworthiness.  In fact, the increasing participation of those lawyers in patent litigation could
help explain why the Court’s recent patent cases, though substantial in number, mainly involve
issues of jurisdiction, procedure, and statutory interpretation—not the core areas of patent law
where the Court’s input would be most useful.
© 2020 Paul R. Gugliuzza.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
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INTRODUCTION
On May 28, 2002, the Supreme Court decided a case with the inimitable
caption of Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.1  As the Court
explained, its opinion “address[ed] once again the relation between two pat-
ent law concepts, the doctrine of equivalents and the rule of prosecution
history estoppel”2—concepts the Court had tackled only five Terms earlier in
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co.3  Later in 2002, in an article
titled The Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme Court to the Bar of Patents,
John Duffy contended that, although the Supreme Court had decided very
few patent cases during the second half of the twentieth century, decisions
such as Festo and Warner-Jenkinson reflected a Court that was “increasingly
comfortable in reviewing patent decisions and increasingly interested in
directing the development of law in the field.”4
Since Duffy wrote that article, the Supreme Court’s engagement with
patent law has grown tremendously.  After deciding less than one patent case
per Term from 1982 (the year the Federal Circuit assumed exclusive jurisdic-
tion over patent appeals)5 through 2004, the Court has since decided more
than forty patent cases—an average of over three per Term.6
Scholars have proposed several explanations for the modern Supreme
Court’s close attention to patent law, and most of them likely contain a grain
of truth.  One common sentiment is that the Federal Circuit, the semispecial-
ized court created to achieve uniformity in patent law, has failed, undone by
the tunnel vision and interest group capture thought to be endemic to spe-
cialized tribunals.7  In a similar vein, the Supreme Court’s recent patent deci-
sions read like a campaign to eliminate what is often referred to as “patent
exceptionalism”8—rulings (usually by the Federal Circuit) that exempt pat-
1 535 U.S. 722 (2002).
2 Id. at 726.
3 520 U.S. 17, 21, 30 (1997).
4 John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme Court to the Bar of
Patents, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 273, 283.  I am indebted to Duffy and his article for inspiring
the title of this piece.
5 See generally Paul R. Gugliuzza, Rethinking Federal Circuit Jurisdiction, 100 GEO. L.J.
1437, 1453–64 (2012) (summarizing the Federal Circuit’s history and jurisdiction).
6 See infra Figure 1.  For a frequently updated list of Supreme Court patent decisions,
see Supreme Court Patent Cases, WRITTEN DESCRIPTION, https://writtendescription.blog
spot.com/p/patents-scotus.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2019).
7 For discussions of the problems commonly associated with specialized courts and
analyses of whether those problems exist in the Federal Circuit, see Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1989);
Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle, 101 NW. U. L.
REV. 1619, 1628–29 (2007); and Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional
Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1110 (2003).  For a more general
analysis of courts—both specialized and not—as potential targets of interest group cap-
ture, see J. Jonas Anderson, Court Capture, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1543, 1574 (2018).
8 See Peter Lee, The Supreme Assimilation of Patent Law, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1413, 1416
(2016).
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ent law from transsubstantive principles of jurisdiction, procedure, and reme-
dies that govern in other areas of federal litigation.9  More benignly, the
Supreme Court, in deciding an increasing number of patent cases, might be
playing the role of “percolator” of patent doctrine—a necessary function in a
field where, because of the Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction, intercir-
cuit dialogue about the content of the law does not exist.10  More simply, the
Court’s large docket of patent cases could reflect the notion that, in a digi-
tized and networked world, intellectual property rights are of greater social
and economic importance than they were a few decades ago.11  Indeed, the
amount of patent litigation in the federal courts has increased in the past
twenty years and, though the magnitude of that increase is a matter of dis-
pute,12 more patent litigation offers the Supreme Court more patent cases to
choose from and raises more issues of patent law to be resolved.  Not only are
the lower courts creating more patent law, Congress is, too.  The America
Invents Act (AIA), passed in 2011,13 has provided the impetus for several
recent Supreme Court decisions in patent cases,14 and disputes involving the
AIA will likely populate the Court’s docket for the foreseeable future.15
In this Article, I seek to introduce an additional consideration into the
ongoing endeavor to understand the Supreme Court’s newfound interest in
patent law: the changing characteristics of the lawyers litigating patent cases
9 See Paul R. Gugliuzza & Megan M. La Belle, The Patently Unexceptional Venue Statute,
66 AM. U. L. REV. 1027, 1028–29 (2017) (providing case examples); see also J. Jonas Ander-
son, Reining in a “Renegade” Court: TC Heartland and the Eastern District of Texas, 39 CAR-
DOZO L. REV. 1569, 1604 (2018) (“[A]n overlooked aspect of the Supreme Court’s recent
patent jurisprudence is how little guidance the Court has provided on patent law doctrine.
The Court appears to be more interested in the procedural aspects of patent litigation
than the substance of patent doctrine.” (footnote omitted)).  For a more general analysis
of interfield consistency as a motivator for granting certiorari, see Tejas N. Narechania,
Certiorari, Universality, and a Patent Puzzle, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1345, 1348 (2018) (suggesting
that, in deciding whether to grant certiorari, “the Supreme Court appears to consider . . .
whether two fields of law apply the same transsubstantive doctrine differently”).
10 See John M. Golden, The Supreme Court as “Prime Percolator”: A Prescription for Appellate
Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. REV. 657, 662 (2009).
11 See Timothy R. Holbrook, Explaining the Supreme Court’s Interest in Patent Law, 3 IP
THEORY 62, 77 (2013).
12 See Matthew Sag, IP Litigation in U.S. District Courts: 1994–2014, 101 IOWA L. REV.
1065, 1078–85 (2016).
13 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).
14 See Return Mail, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 139 S. Ct. 1853, 1858–59 (2019); Helsinn
Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 628, 630 (2019); Oil States Energy
Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1370 (2018); SAS Inst. Inc. v.
Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1352–53 (2018); Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131,
2136 (2016); see also Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1664, 1669 (2017) (involving the
Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act, which was passed in 2010 as part of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act).
15 See, e.g., Dex Media, Inc. v. Click-to-Call Techs., LP, 139 S. Ct. 2742 (2019) (mem.)
(granting cert on the question of whether a party may appeal the Patent Office’s decision
about whether a postissuance patent challenge is time barred).
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on appeal.  The past few decades have seen the emergence of a small, elite
group of lawyers specializing not in any substantive area of law but in litiga-
tion at the Supreme Court.16  The academic literature on this new Supreme
Court bar suggests that the Court is highly sympathetic to the arguments
pressed by those elite lawyers, who often represent the world’s largest corpo-
rations in matters of significant interest to the business community.17  This
Article extends those insights to the field of patent law, presenting the results
of a novel empirical study showing that the elite Supreme Court bar has,
indeed, arrived at the bar of patents.
As recently as a decade ago, elite Supreme Court advocates—which I
generally define as lawyers who have presented oral argument in five or more
Supreme Court cases in the preceding ten years18—filed barely 10% of cert
petitions in patent cases arising out of the Federal Circuit.  Since 2010, how-
ever, that percentage has more than doubled: over the seven Terms from
2010 through 2016, a small group of lawyers—no more than thirty strong
and headed by well-known generalist appellate litigators such as Carter Phil-
lips, Paul Clement, Seth Waxman, and Tom Goldstein—served as counsel of
record on nearly a quarter of cert petitions filed in Federal Circuit patent
cases.
This correlation between the increased presence of elite advocates in
Supreme Court patent litigation and the Court’s growing docket of patent
cases of course does not prove causation.  The data I have gathered, however,
suggests that elite lawyers have helped shape the Court’s agenda at the behest
of their often well-heeled clients.  Specifically, I find that, in patent cases, a
cert petition filed by an elite advocate is three times more likely to be granted
than a petition filed by a lawyer outside that group.  Moreover, although elite
lawyers accounted for only 16% of cert petitions filed in patent cases from
2002 through 2016, they accounted for 40% of the petitions granted review.
Both of these findings are statistically significant at the 1% level.  In short,
though many different factors have surely influenced the Supreme Court to
take a greater interest in patent law, the presence of elite advocates seeking
certiorari deserves, at minimum, a spot on the list.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows.  Part I describes the
datasets I built for this project, including a novel collection of every cert peti-
tion filed in a Federal Circuit patent case from 2002 through 2016.  Drawing
on those datasets, Part II provides original empirical evidence illustrating
16 See Joan Biskupic et al., The Echo Chamber: At America’s Court of Last Resort, a Handful
of Lawyers Now Dominates the Docket, REUTERS (Dec. 8, 2014), https://www.reuters.com/
investigates/special-report/scotus.
17 See Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within the Supreme Court: Transform-
ing the Court by Transforming the Bar, 96 GEO. L.J. 1487, 1490–91 (2008); see also Katherine
Shaw, Essay, Friends of the Court: Evaluating the Supreme Court’s Amicus Invitations, 101 COR-
NELL L. REV. 1533, 1541 (2016) (noting that “the experience and talents” of elite Supreme
Court lawyers “are disproportionately deployed in the service of business interests,” and
discussing the “troubling distributional consequences” of that dynamic).
18 For a more detailed discussion of my definition of the Supreme Court elite, see infra
Section I.A.
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that, over the past few decades, the Supreme Court’s interest in patent law
has increased not only in terms of the raw number of cases decided but,
more importantly, in a relative sense: cert petitions in patent cases, my data
indicates, are two to three times more likely to be granted today than they
were a decade ago.  And cert petitions in patent cases are now nearly twice as
likely to be granted as the average petition, unlike in the recent past, when
cert petitions in patent cases were less likely to be granted than the average
petition.  Part III then presents evidence linking the elite Supreme Court
bar’s involvement in patent litigation to the Court’s growing docket of patent
cases.  It also shows how cases involving elite lawyers are more likely to have
other characteristics widely acknowledged to make a cert grant more likely,
such as an order from the Court calling for the views of the Solicitor General,
a large number of cert-stage amicus briefs, or both.  Part IV concludes this
Article by discussing some limitations of the data that is currently available
and sketching a roadmap for future research to better understand how the
elite bar shapes both the Supreme Court’s agenda in patent cases and the
substance of patent law.
I. DATASETS, DEFINITIONS, AND METHODOLOGY
This Part describes the four novel datasets I built to prepare this Article.
It begins by summarizing the data I used to identify the lawyers who qualify as
members of the elite Supreme Court bar and by explaining the definition of
“elite” that I chose to employ.  It then describes a unique dataset I con-
structed containing all cert petitions in Federal Circuit patent cases over the
past fifteen years, as well as two datasets of amicus briefs and calls for the view
of the Solicitor General (SG), both of which provide useful points of compar-
ison for the patent-specific data I have gathered.
A. The Elite Supreme Court Bar: Data and Definition
The first of the four datasets I built for this project contains, among
other information, the identity and organizational affiliation (law firm, gov-
ernment entity, etc.) of every lawyer who conducted oral argument in every
case (not just patent cases) heard by the Supreme Court from October
Terms (OTs) 1992 through 2016.19  This dataset allowed me to determine
which lawyers, exactly, comprise the elite Supreme Court bar.  For the pur-
pose of this Article, I considered a lawyer to be a member of that group if the
19 I obtained the identity of the lawyers conducting oral argument from the Supreme
Court’s journal, which contains the official minutes of the Court from each day the Court
is in session. See Journal, SUP. CT. U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/journal.
aspx (last visited Nov. 11, 2019).  In most circumstances, I obtained information about
each lawyer’s organizational affiliation from the briefs in the case, which were usually avail-
able on Westlaw or ProQuest Supreme Court Insight. See infra note 46.  I occasionally
obtained affiliation information from other sources, such as the transcript of oral argu-
ment, which often lists organizational affiliation for government lawyers.
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lawyer had presented oral argument in at least five cases in the Term under
review and the preceding ten Terms, combined.20
I adopted this definition of elite (to the exclusion over other possible
metrics, such as number of cert petitions filed or affiliation with a law firm
that has a significant Supreme Court practice) because I view the repeated,
individual presentation of oral argument before the Justices to be the best
indicator that a lawyer is a member of the elite.  Those individual presenta-
tions allow the Justices to become familiar with the lawyer and his or her
work.  Even more importantly, the individual delivery of oral argument cre-
ates the news coverage and notoriety that allows lawyers to be known, by
name, to the Justices’ law clerks.
In assessing the factors that influence the Court to grant or deny certio-
rari, it is difficult to overstate the importance of law clerks.21  The Court
receives over six thousand cert petitions every year,22 and it is the law
clerks—not the Justices—who sift through those petitions and identify the
small number that are plausibly worthy of review.23  (In a given Term, the
Court grants between seventy and eighty petitions.)24  To lighten the law
clerks’ workload, most chambers participate in the “cert pool”—an arrange-
ment under which one law clerk prepares a memo analyzing the petition’s
certworthiness for all of the Justices participating in the pool (currently
seven).25  Petitions identified as possibly worth granting are put on a list for
further discussion and a vote at the Justices’ weekly conference.26
Importantly, when a law clerk’s memo recommends that a petition be
denied, that is typically the end of the road—odds are no Justice will ever even
see that petition.27  As H.W. Perry put it in his definitive study of the cert
process: “Clerks are probably more influential in cert. than in opinion writ-
ing because often the justice defers to their analysis of the issues in a cert.
petition . . . . [M]ost justices never read more than the clerk’s memo if the
20 So, for example, a lawyer filing a cert petition in a patent case in the 2016 Term met
my definition of elite if he or she had presented argument in at least five cases from the
2006 Term through the 2016 Term, inclusive.
21 See H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT 69 (1991) (“[O]ne cannot talk about the agenda-setting process without
talking about the law clerks.”).
22 See, e.g., Statistics as of June 29, 2018, J. SUP. CT. U.S., Oct. Term 2017, at II, https://
www.supremecourt.gov/orders/journal/Jnl17.pdf (reporting 6315 new cases docketed
during the 2017 Term).
23 For a summary of the law clerks’ responsibilities in processing cert petitions, see
STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 40–42, 318–21 (10th ed. 2013).
24 See, e.g., Statistics as of June 29, 2018, supra note 22, at II (reporting seventy-seven
granted petitions in the 2017 Term).
25 Tony Mauro, Unlike Gorsuch, Kavanaugh Jumps into SCOTUS Cert Pool, NAT’L L.J.
(Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2018/10/11/unlike-gorsuch-
kavanaugh-jumps-into-scotus-cert-pool.  Justices Alito and Gorsuch do not participate. Id.
26 Any chambers can request that a case be added to the so-called discuss list. PERRY,
supra note 21, at 43.
27 See SHAPIRO ET AL., supra note 23, at 321 (“[C]ases that do not appear on the [dis-
cuss] list by the day before the conference are automatically denied . . . .”).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-3\NDL306.txt unknown Seq: 7  6-MAR-20 10:43
2020] the  supreme  court  bar  at  the  bar  of  patents 1239
recommendation is to deny.”28  Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his historical
monograph about the Court, confirmed the great—if not dispositive—
weight given to the clerk’s recommendation on cert, writing: “As soon as I am
confident that my new law clerks are reliable, I take their word and that of
the pool memo writer . . . and with a large majority of the petitions it is not
necessary to go any further than the pool memo.”29
Thus, at the cert stage, the Justices’ law clerks play a crucially important
screening function.  How do the clerks wield their power?  From a clerk’s
perspective, it is risky to recommend that the Court grant review.  Grant rec-
ommendations are subjected to rigorous scrutiny, both for whether review
should, in fact, be granted, as well as for procedural infirmities that might
prove the law clerk’s recommendation to have been mistaken.30  By contrast,
denial recommendations are rarely second guessed, as the discussion above
suggests.  Thus, law clerks, by most accounts, will search for “objectively iden-
tifiable grounds” to justify a grant recommendation—most commonly, a split
of authority among the courts below.31
Circuit splits, however, rarely happen in patent cases because of the cen-
tralization of appeals in the Federal Circuit.32  In the absence of circuit splits,
another “objective” factor that might drive law clerk decisionmaking at the
cert stage—and which this Article focuses on—is the identity (and accompa-
nying expertise) of the petitioner’s counsel of record, as indicated on the
cover of the cert petition.33  The rich, emerging literature on the new
Supreme Court bar suggests that lawyer identity matters at the cert stage in
all types of cases.34  In patent cases, lawyer identity may play an outsized role
28 PERRY, supra note 21, at 70.
29 WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 233–34 (Alfred A. Knopf new ed.
2004) (1987).
30 See PERRY, supra note 21, at 63; see also Kenneth W. Starr, Essay, The Supreme Court
and Its Shrinking Docket: The Ghost of William Howard Taft, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1363, 1376–77
(2006) (“The prevailing ethos is that no harm can flow from ‘just saying no.’  Self-confi-
dent law clerks can rest assured that few, if any, recriminations will attend their providing
guidance to the Court to deny certiorari.  Harm can, and indeed does, flow when a hapless
clerk recommends a grant of certiorari, and the merits are eventually seen as not all they
were cracked up to be.” (footnotes omitted)).
31 David R. Stras, The Supreme Court’s Gatekeepers: The Role of Law Clerks in the Certiorari
Process, 85 TEX. L. REV. 947, 980 (2007) (book review); see also SUP. CT. R. 10(a)–(b) (listing
conflicting decisions between the federal courts of appeals, state courts, or both, as “Con-
siderations Governing Review on Certiorari”).
32 See Narechania, supra note 9, at 1347.
33 SUP. CT. R. 34(1)(f) (requiring the name of petitioner’s counsel to appear on the
petition’s cover).
34 See, e.g., Lazarus, supra note 17, at 1526 (“When [the law clerks] see the name of an
attorney whose work before the Court they know, at least by reputation, that attorney’s
involvement in the case, by itself, conveys an important message about the significance of
the legal issues being presented and the credibility of the assertions being made.”).
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because of the lack of other objective indicators of certworthiness, such as a
circuit split.35
In developing the definition of “elite” Supreme Court lawyer for this
Article, the significant influence of law clerks at the cert stage is what led me
to require a lawyer’s appearances before the Supreme Court to be within the
past decade.  Law clerks, relatively fresh out of law school, may not as readily
recognize the name of a lawyer who argued, say, ten Supreme Court cases
two decades ago as they will the name of a lawyer who has argued at least one
case every other Term in the past decade.
This definition, no doubt, ultimately classifies as nonelite some petitions
filed by lawyers with whom the Justices and their law clerks are surely famil-
iar, either through prior arguments or the advocates’ own Supreme Court
clerkships.36  But other recent studies documenting the emergence of a spe-
cialized Supreme Court bar have similarly used five arguments as the line
that must necessarily be drawn to provide a definition of the elite.  For
instance, in their exhaustive story on the existence and impact of the expert
Supreme Court bar, journalist Joan Biskupic and her coauthors defined as a
“top oral advocate” anyone who argued at least five cases during the past
decade.37  Richard Lazarus, in his pathmarking law review article on the
emergence of the modern Supreme Court bar, adopted a slightly more capa-
cious definition, identifying a lawyer as an expert in Supreme Court advocacy
if the lawyer had presented at least five oral arguments in his or her career or
was affiliated with a firm whose attorneys had collectively argued at least ten
cases.38
Though my definition of elite is relatively narrow, it should be noted
that a broader definition (for example, requiring only one prior argument or
considering firm affiliation) would likely only strengthen my results showing
elite lawyers’ increasing domination of Supreme Court patent litigation.  In
recent years, the Court has granted several patent petitions filed by lawyers
from firms with significant Supreme Court practices and who have previously
argued before the Court—just not quite frequently enough to qualify as elite,
as I have defined that term.39  In Part III of the Article, I present some back-
ground data on the number of lawyers who met my definition of elite.
35 Cf. Narechania, supra note 9, at 1348 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s cert deci-
sions in patent cases are influenced by the existence of “field splits”—situations in which
“two fields of law apply the same transsubstantive doctrine differently”).
36 See Shaw, supra note 17, at 1556–57 (discussing the importance of a prior Supreme
Court clerkship in obtaining an appointment from the Court to argue as an amicus).
37 Biskupic et al., supra note 16.
38 Lazarus, supra note 17, at 1502.
39 See, e.g., Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s
Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018) (No. 16-712), 2016 WL 6995217 (Allyson Ho,
then of Morgan Lewis, who at the time had argued three cases before the Court); Petition
for a Writ of Certiorari, SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018) (No. 16-969), 2017
WL 491052 (Greg Castanias of Jones Day, who at the time had argued four cases before the
Court); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, TC Heartland, LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands
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B. Cert Petitions in Patent Cases, Amicus Briefs, and CVSGs
The second dataset I created for this Article contains every cert petition
filed in a patent case arising out of the Federal Circuit that the Supreme
Court either granted or denied from the 2002 Term through the 2016
Term.40  To create that dataset, I used the Supreme Court’s journal41 to com-
pile a list of every cert petition arising from a Federal Circuit case during
those Terms.  I included only petitions for which the petitioner paid the $300
filing fee;42 I excluded petitions filed in forma pauperis because those peti-
tions are rarely granted43—and certainly not in any patent case since 1982.44
The next step was to winnow that list of paid cert petitions to patent cases
only.  Many cases could be easily identified as having nothing to do with pat-
ents by reviewing the Federal Circuit’s decision or, in some circumstances, by
merely reading the caption.45  For every other case, I personally reviewed the
LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017) (No. 16-341), 2016 WL 4983136 (James Dabney of Hughes
Hubbard, who at the time had argued three cases before the Court).
40 The dataset does not include petitions that were voluntarily dismissed by the par-
ties—due to settlement, for instance. See, e.g., Maersk Drilling USA, Inc. v. Transocean
Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2333 (2014) (mem.). See generally SUP. CT. R.
46(1) (“At any stage of the proceedings, whenever all parties file with the Clerk an agree-
ment in writing that a case be dismissed, . . . the Clerk, without further reference to the
Court, will enter an order of dismissal.”).
41 See supra note 19.
42 See SUP. CT. R. 38(a).
43 SHAPIRO ET AL., supra note 23, at 557–58.
44 Separating paid petitions from in forma pauperis petitions is made easier by the
Court’s docket numbering system, which assigns paid petitions docket numbers between
YY-1 and YY-4999 (where YY is the last two digits of the Term in which the petition was
filed) and in forma pauperis petitions docket numbers of YY-5000 and above. See Kevin
Russell, Mystery of the Premature Docket Number, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 28, 2009), http://
www.scotusblog.com/2009/09/mystery-of-the-premature-docket-number (explaining also
that the Court begins to assign docket numbers for the subsequent Term in June, after the
Court has handed down the current Term’s final opinions but before the subsequent
Term technically begins on the first Monday of October, see 28 U.S.C. § 2 (2012)).  If you
are still reading this footnote, kudos to you for your enthusiasm about the minutiae of
Supreme Court administration!
45 For instance, cases in which the respondent was the Merit Systems Protection Board
or the Secretary of Veterans Affairs could readily be coded as nonpatent cases.  Nonpatent
cases account for 47.2% (551 of 1168) of the paid cert petitions seeking review of Federal
Circuit decisions from 2002 through 2016.  The proportion of nonpatent cert petitions
gradually declined during the period covered by my study.  In nearly every Term from
2002 through 2011, nonpatent petitions accounted for over half of all paid petitions.  From
2012 through 2016, however, the average proportion of nonpatent petitions declined to
37.2%.  Similar changes have occurred at the Federal Circuit, where the court’s docket is
increasingly populated by patent cases, due largely to the growing number of appeals from
the new post-issuance proceedings created by the America Invents Act. See U.S. COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FED. CIRCUIT, APPEALS FILED IN MAJOR ORIGINS (n.d.), http://www.cafc.us
courts.gov/sites/default/files/the-court/statistics/02-_Hist_Caseld_by_Origin_through_
FY18_-_Final.pdf.  For additional data on the proportion of cert petitions in patent and
nonpatent cases, see infra Appendix, Table A1.
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cert petition to determine whether the underlying case was, in fact, a patent
case.  The full text of most petitions was available on Westlaw; for the peti-
tions that were not on Westlaw I used ProQuest Supreme Court Insight.46
The vast majority of petitions could easily be classified as patent or non-
patent based on the question presented, but a small number of petitions,
perhaps one or two per Term, presented close calls.  Ultimately, I coded a
petition as a patent petition if it presented (1) a substantive question of pat-
ent law (such as a question about patentability, infringement,47 or claim con-
struction); (2) a question about the interpretation or application of the
Patent Act (such as a question about attorneys’ fees or enhanced damages);48
(3) a question of procedural law, jurisdictional law, or remedies in a case
involving a live claim arising under patent law;49 or (4) a question of nonpat-
ent law in a case in which the existence of a patent provided the basis for the
dispute, such as an antitrust claim based on patent-related conduct50 or a
contract claim involving a patent license.51  By contrast, I coded a petition as
a nonpatent petition if it presented (1) only substantive issues of nonpatent
law52 or (2) a question of procedural law in a case in which the patent claims
were entirely out of the dispute by the time it reached the cert stage.53  It
46 See Supreme Court Insight (1975–Present), PROQUEST, https://www.proquest.com/
products-services/Supreme-Court-Insight.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2019).
47 Including exhaustion of patent rights. E.g., Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark
Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1529 (2017).
48 E.g., Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1928 (2016) (considering
the standard for awarding enhanced damages under § 284 of the Patent Act); Octane Fit-
ness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1749 (2014) (considering the
standard for granting attorneys’ fees to a prevailing party under § 285 of the Patent Act).
49 Examples of patent cases raising procedural, jurisdictional, or remedial issues
include Unitherm Food Systems, Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394, 396–97 (2006) (hold-
ing, in a patent infringement dispute, that a party’s failure to move for a new trial or for
judgment as a matter of law after a jury verdict forecloses that party from seeking a new
trial on appeal based on insufficiency of the evidence); International Rectifier Corp. v. IXYS
Corp., 555 U.S. 882 (2008) (mem.) (denying cert on a question about notice of appeal
deadlines in a patent infringement dispute); and eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S.
388, 390 (2006) (considering the standard for granting injunctive relief after a finding of
patent infringement).
50 E.g., Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 2, Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v.
Bayer AG, 557 U.S. 920 (2009) (mem.) (No. 08-1194), 2009 WL 797579 (antitrust chal-
lenge to “reverse payment” settlements of pharmaceutical patent litigation).
51 Though it did not originate in the Federal Circuit and hence is not included in my
dataset, a good example would be Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2405
(2015) (holding unenforceable contracts charging royalties after a patent expires).
52 A paradigmatic example is Oracle America, Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir.
2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2887 (2015) (mem.), which was appealed to the Federal Cir-
cuit because the original complaint included patent infringement claims.  Those patent
claims were entirely out of the case by the time Google filed its cert petition. See id. at
1347.
53 Examples include Wayne-Dalton Corp. v. Amarr Co., 558 U.S. 991 (2009) (mem.)
(denying cert on a question about the Federal Circuit’s use of no-opinion affirmances in a
case where the live claim was for false advertising under the Lanham Act); and Designing
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bears emphasizing that the number of close cases was extremely small—no
more than fifteen or twenty in the entire dataset—so slightly different coding
practices would not significantly affect the overall results.
My dataset of paid cert petitions in Federal Circuit patent cases, which
covers fifteen Terms (2002 through 2016), contains 589 petitions, excluding
petitions that the Supreme Court granted, vacated, and remanded
(“GVR’d”).  The most common reason for a GVR is that the Court has issued
a plenary ruling that is potentially relevant to the question presented.54  Less
commonly, the Court will GVR if the case becomes moot (usually due to
settlement) while the cert petition is pending.55  Because a GVR usually indi-
cates little about the petition’s merits, I exclude GVR’d petitions from the
analysis below unless otherwise indicated.56
I then coded each patent petition for, among other things, the peti-
tioner’s counsel of record (as it appeared on the cover of the petition); the
counsel of record’s organizational affiliation; whether the respondent waived
the right to respond (and, if it did, whether the Court subsequently
requested a response); whether any amicus briefs were filed at the cert stage
(and, if they were, how many); whether the Court issued an order calling for
the views of the Solicitor General (and, if it did, what the Solicitor General
recommended); the Court’s disposition of the petition (granted, denied, or
GVR’d); and, for petitions that were granted, whether the petitioner was a
patentee, accused infringer, or neither (such as the Solicitor General seeking
review on behalf of the Patent Office).
In addition to my datasets of Supreme Court oral arguments and patent
case cert petitions, I created two other datasets to provide reference points
for my patent-specific data.  First, I created a dataset of all cert petitions (not
just petitions in patent cases) on which the Court issued a call for the views of
the Solicitor General (a “CVSG,” colloquially) from 2002 through 2016.  As I
explain in more detail below, a CVSG often foreshadows the grant of cert.57
My objective in creating a dataset of CVSGs was to explore the extent to
which the Court’s CVSG practice might differ in patent cases as compared to
other types of cases.
To create the dataset of CVSG cases, I used the Supreme Court’s journal
to identify petitions on which the Court issued a CVSG.  I then personally
reviewed the Solicitor General’s brief to determine its recommendation
(grant, deny, GVR, or more a nuanced recommendation, such as to hold the
Health, Inc. v. Erasmus, 552 U.S. 887 (2007) (mem.) (denying cert on issues about posttrial
motions and the Seventh Amendment in a case where the live claims were for fraud and
breach of fiduciary duty).
54 See, e.g., Medinol Ltd. v. Cordis Corp., 137 S. Ct. 1372 (2017) (mem.) (GVR’ing in
light of SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Products, LLC, 137 S. Ct. 954, 959
(2017), which held that laches cannot be asserted as a defense to a claim for damages for
patent infringement).
55 See, e.g., LG Elecs., Inc. v. InterDigital Commc’ns, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 1876 (2014)
(mem.).
56 Including GVR’d petitions, my dataset contains 617 petitions.
57 See infra Section II.C.
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petition pending a decision in another case).58  Most of the SG’s briefs were
available on Westlaw; those that were not were available on the SG’s web-
site.59  I then used Westlaw or the Supreme Court’s docket to determine the
Court’s action on the petition and to code for whether it agreed or disagreed
with the SG’s recommendation.  Finally, for each case in which the Court
issued a CVSG, I used Westlaw or ProQuest Supreme Court Insight to deter-
mine the identity of the petitioner’s counsel of record as indicated on the
cert petition itself.
As a second and final point of comparison, I created a dataset of amicus
briefs filed at the cert stage in all paid cases in three Supreme Court Terms:
2002, 2010, and 2016.  To create this dataset, I, with the help of research
assistants, reviewed the docket for every case in which the Supreme Court
either granted or denied certiorari in the 2002, 2010, and 2016 Terms.  We
again used the Supreme Court’s journal to identify the relevant grants and
denials, and we excluded petitions that were dismissed, GVR’d, or on which
the Court issued a summary reversal.  We also excluded amicus briefs filed by
the federal government in response to a CVSG.  Because this process
required reviewing the individual docket for over 1500 cases per Term, we
limited the dataset to the three Terms mentioned above.  I chose those
Terms in particular because of their significance to the Court’s growing
docket of patent cases.  As discussed below, 2002 predates the dramatic
growth of Supreme Court patent decisions, 2010 marks the beginning of the
most substantial period of growth, and 2016 was the most recently concluded
Term when I was collecting the data for this Article.60
II. THE SUPREME COURT’S INCREASING INTEREST IN PATENT LAW
Not long ago, the Supreme Court was, as Mark Janis put it, “well nigh
invisible” in matters of patent law.61  For the first fifteen years of the Federal
Circuit’s existence, 1982 through 1997, the Supreme Court decided, at most,
one patent case per Term.62  Though the Court decided three patent cases
in both the 1998 and 2001 Terms, the average number of patent cases
decided per Term since the Federal Circuit’s creation remained below one
until 2011—the eighth of a now fifteen-consecutive-Term streak of the
Supreme Court deciding at least one patent case.  In fact, in each of the past
nine Terms (2010 through 2018), the Court has decided at least two patent
58 Occasionally, a case settles after the Court issues its CVSG but before the SG files its
brief. See, e.g., Maersk Drilling USA, Inc. v. Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc.,
134 S. Ct. 2333 (2014) (mem.).  In that circumstance, there is simply no SG recommenda-
tion to include in the dataset.
59 Supreme Court Briefs, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/osg/supreme-court-
briefs (last visited Nov. 1, 2019).
60 Supreme Court Terms begin and end on the first Monday of October.  28 U.S.C. § 2
(2012).  Thus, the 2016 Term ended in October 2017.
61 Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in the Age of the Invisible Supreme Court, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV.
387, 387.
62 See infra Figure 1.
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cases, averaging 3.44 patent decisions per Term over that time period.  Fig-
ure 1 below graphically illustrates the number of patent cases decided by the
Supreme Court, per Term, from 1982 through 2018.63
FIGURE 1: PATENT CASES DECIDED BY THE SUPREME COURT,
OT1982 THROUGH OT201864
As mentioned in the Introduction, the main objective of this Article is to
highlight an explanation for the growth of the Supreme Court’s patent
docket that is rarely mentioned in the literature: the increasing involvement
63 Though Figure 1 indicates that the Supreme Court has decided a patent case in
only fifteen consecutive Terms, the Court has already granted cert on two cases to be heard
in the current 2019 Term, Dex Media, Inc. v. Click-to-Call Technologies, LP, 139 S. Ct. 2742
(2019) (mem.); and Iancu v. NantKwest, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1292 (2019) (mem.), making it
almost certain that the streak will extend to sixteen Terms.
64 The primary source of the data reported in Figure 1 is Supreme Court Patent Cases,
supra note 6.  Note that Figure 1 includes three patent-related Supreme Court cases that
did not arise from the Federal Circuit: Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401
(2015) (arising from the Ninth Circuit); Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251 (2013) (arising from
the Texas Supreme Court); and FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136 (2013) (arising from the
Eleventh Circuit).  Because of the unusual origins of those cases, I exclude them from the
remainder of this study unless otherwise indicated.  Figure 1 also includes two cases that
raised a purely procedural issue in the context of a patent infringement dispute: Unitherm
Food Systems, Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394, 396–97 (2006); and Nelson v. Adams
USA, Inc., 529 U.S. 460, 463 (2000), in accordance with this Article’s definition of “patent
case,” discussed above. See supra Section I.B.  Lastly, Figure 1 counts Halo Electronics, Inc. v.
Pulse Electronics, Inc. and Stryker Corp. v. Zimmer, Inc. as a single case because the cases were
argued and decided in a consolidated fashion. See Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc.,
136 S. Ct. 1923, 1931 (2016). See generally Timothy R. Holbrook, Is the Supreme Court
Concerned with Patent Law, the Federal Circuit, or Both: A Response to Judge Timothy B. Dyk, 16
CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 313, 314 n.8 (2016) (describing the occasional difficulties in
categorizing and counting Supreme Court patent cases).
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of the elite, specialized Supreme Court bar in appellate patent litigation.  To
set the stage for that analysis, this Part of the Article provides empirical evi-
dence about how much, exactly, the Supreme Court’s interest in patent law
has grown, and it suggests that two factors strongly correlated with a cert
grant in all types of cases—the presence of amicus briefs at the cert stage and
the involvement of the Solicitor General—may play an outsized role in pat-
ent cases.
A. A Relative View of the Supreme Court’s Growing Patent Docket
Observers—including elite Supreme Court advocates themselves—often
cite the growing raw number of Supreme Court decisions in patent cases (as
reflected on Figure 1 above) as evidence of the Court’s “increased interest”
in patent law.65  Yet that is ultimately a relative claim.  It could be that the
Court is simply receiving a greater number of cert petitions in patent cases
and is granting them at the same rate it always has.  Or grant rates could be
increasing in all types of cases, not just patent cases.  The data I have col-
lected, however, indicates that patent law has, in fact, become a more impor-
tant topic at the Supreme Court relative to other areas of law.  I make this
claim based on two observations.
First, cert petitions in patent cases are more likely to be granted today
than they were a decade ago.  From 2002 through 2016, the Supreme Court
granted 6.6% of paid cert petitions in Federal Circuit patent cases (39 of
589).  Yet, from 2002 through 2009, the grant rate was only 3.9% (11 of 283).
From 2010 through 2016, however, the grant rate more than doubled to
9.2% (28 of 306), a change that is statistically significant at the 1% level
(p = .009).66  Figure 2 below indicates the number and percentage of patent
petitions granted and denied on a Term-by-Term basis, showing that the
grant rate has varied between a low of 0.0% (five times, but not since 2011)
and a high of 18.8% (6 of 32) in 2010.
65 E.g., Seth P. Waxman, May You Live in Interesting Times: Patent Law in the Supreme
Court, 17 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 214, 216 (2017).
66 Because the data presented throughout this Article includes the entire population
of relevant cases during the time periods of interest, the results are arguably statistically
significant by definition.  Nevertheless, to provide a sense of the importance of observed
differences, I report p-values at several points, based on the assumption that my data is a
sample of a larger population.  Unless otherwise indicated, to calculate p-values, I used
Microsoft Excel to perform a two-tail t-test.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-3\NDL306.txt unknown Seq: 15  6-MAR-20 10:43
2020] the  supreme  court  bar  at  the  bar  of  patents 1247
FIGURE 2: PAID CERT PETITIONS GRANTED OR DENIED IN FEDERAL CIRCUIT
PATENT CASES, OT2002 THROUGH OT2016
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A second indicator of the increased importance of patent cases at the
Supreme Court is that cert petitions in patent cases today are more likely to
be granted than the average cert petition whereas, not long ago, patent peti-
tions were less likely than average to be granted.  To make an accurate com-
parison to the data the Supreme Court publishes about its overall grant rate,
we must treat GVR’d petitions as being denied plenary review, which lowers
the grant rate in Federal Circuit patent cases slightly, from 6.6% to 6.3% (39
of 617).  As Figure 3 below illustrates, the Supreme Court’s overall grant rate
in paid cases is 4.3%67—32% lower than the grant rate in patent cases and a
difference that is statistically significant at the 5% level (p = .045).  In five of
the seven most recent Terms captured in my data (2010 through 2016), the
grant rate in patent cases exceeded the overall grant rate, often substantially.
Over those seven Terms, the grant rate in Federal Circuit patent cases was
8.0% (28 of 350, including GVR’d cases as denials).  The overall grant rate
for that period, by contrast, was 4.4%.  That difference is also statistically sig-
nificant (p = .015).  Looking back to an earlier period, the grant rate in Fed-
eral Circuit patent cases from 2002 through 2009, including GVR’d cases as
denials, was only 4.0% (11 of 278).  The overall grant rate for that period, by
contrast, was 4.3%.  That small difference in grant rates during this earlier
time period is not statistically significant (p = .793).
67 I obtained the Supreme Court’s overall grant rate from the statistics entry in the
Harvard Law Review’s annual Supreme Court review. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 2016
Term—The Statistics, 131 HARV. L. REV. 403, 410 tbl.II(B) (2017).  The grant rate reported
by the Harvard Law Review, which is, in turn, based on statistics reported in the Supreme
Court’s journals, see supra note 19, appears to treat GVR’d cases as, essentially, denials. See R
The Supreme Court, 2016 Term—The Statistics, supra, at 410 n.f (including only cases granted
plenary review as “grants” for the purpose of calculating the overall grant rate).
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FIGURE 3: PAID CERT PETITION GRANT RATES, FEDERAL CIRCUIT PATENT
CASES VERSUS ALL CASES, OT2002 THROUGH OT2016
To put it simply: today, cert petitions in patent cases are more than twice
as likely to be granted than they were a decade or two ago, and petitions in
patent cases are roughly twice as likely to be granted as the average cert
petition.
Having established that cert petitions in patent cases are increasingly
likely to be granted, the next question—and the question that occupies
much of the rest of this Article—is whether there is a way to tell which patent
petitions are most likely to be granted.  To help answer that question, I have
collected data on two factors identified in the literature as correlated with the
Supreme Court’s decision to grant or deny certiorari in all types of cases: the
presence of amicus briefs at the cert stage and the issuance of a call for the
views of the Solicitor General.  Those factors, it turns out, may be even more
salient in patent cases than in other areas of law.
B. Amicus Briefs
As Table 1 below illustrates, cert-stage amicus briefs were filed alongside
20.0% (118 of 589) of paid cert petitions in patent cases from 2002 through
2016.68  This level of amicus activity is noticeably higher than the comparable
data for all paid cert petitions filed in 2002, 2010, and 2016, which were
68 In counting amicus briefs for the purpose of this Article, I have included both briefs
filed in support of and in opposition to the petition because of the conventional wisdom
that any cert-stage amicus brief calls attention to the case and therefore makes a grant
more likely. See SHAPIRO ET AL., supra note 23, at 515 (“[A] nonparty whose interest favors
the denial of certiorari ordinarily does not wish . . . to accentuate the importance of the
case by filing a brief revealing that importance and concern; thus it is generally advisa-
ble . . . to forgo an amicus brief until after review is granted, if it is.”).  In any event—
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accompanied by amicus briefs in, respectively, 8.5%, 11.6%, and 15.9% of
cases.69
TABLE 1: CERT-STAGE AMICUS BRIEFS, FEDERAL CIRCUIT PATENT CASES
VERSUS OVERALL
 
Federal Circuit Patent Cases 
OT2002–2016 
All Petitions 
OT2002 
All Petitions 
OT2010 
All Petitions  
OT2016 
 Petitions % % % % 
With  
Amicus 118 20.0% 8.5% 11.6% 15.9% 
Without  
Amicus 471 80.0% 91.5% 88.4% 84.1% 
Indeed, in each of those individual Terms, the proportion of patent peti-
tions supported by at least one amicus brief exceeds the overall numbers: In
the 2002 Term, 11.8% of patent petitions (4 of 34) were accompanied by at
least one amicus brief, as compared to 8.5% of petitions overall.  In the 2010
Term, 29.0% of patent petitions (9 of 31) were accompanied by at least one
amicus brief, as compared to 11.6% overall.  And in 2016, 31.1% of patent
petitions (19 of 61) were accompanied by at least one amicus brief, as com-
pared to 15.9% overall.  Though these numbers indicate an upward trend in
the number of cert-stage amicus briefs filed in both patent cases and overall,
the difference between the number of amicus briefs filed in patent cases as
compared to the overall numbers is statistically significant for both the 2010
and 2016 Terms,70 meaning that, in general, recent patent cases have
involved an unusually high level of amicus activity at the cert stage.  As I
explain in more detail below, this increase in amicus activity in patent cases
neatly corresponds to the increased involvement of elite Supreme Court law-
yers in patent disputes.71
Elite lawyers are well aware that eliciting support from sympathetic amici
vastly increases the chance of review.72  One early study concluded that a
petition supported by at least one amicus brief was four to five times more
probably because of this conventional wisdom—the number of amicus briefs filed in oppo-
sition to review is vanishingly small.
69 For other points of reference about the quantity of cert-stage amicus briefs filed
overall, see Allison Orr Larsen & Neal Devins, The Amicus Machine, 102 VA. L. REV. 1901,
1939 tbl.2 (2016) (reporting that 14.2% of cert petitions were supported by amicus briefs
in the 2014 Term); Lazarus, supra note 17, at 1529 tbl.4 (reporting that 9.5% of cert peti-
tions were supported by amicus briefs in the 2005 Term).  Those figures (and the increase
from 2005 to 2014) are consistent with my data, though it should be noted that those prior
studies included only briefs filed in support of the petition, not the small number filed
against review. See Larsen & Devins, supra, at 1939 n.217; Lazarus, supra note 17, at 1529.
70 For 2010, p = .045 and for 2016, p = .014.  For 2002, when the spread between
patent cases and the overall numbers was smaller, p = .566.
71 See infra subsection III.B.2.
72 See infra notes 116–20 and accompanying text.
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likely to be granted than a petition filed without amicus support.73  The
more recent data I have collected, reported on Table 2 below, indicates that
filing an amicus brief makes a grant eight to nine times more likely.74  The
presence of a cert-stage amicus brief in a patent case similarly makes the
probability of grant about eight times more likely.75
TABLE 2: AMICUS BRIEFS AND CERT GRANTS/DENIALS, FEDERAL CIRCUIT
PATENT CASES VERSUS OVERALL
 
Federal Circuit Patent Cases 
OT2002–2016 
All Petitions 
OT2002 
All Petitions 
OT2010 
All Petitions  
OT2016 
 Denied Granted % Granted % Granted % Granted % Granted 
With  
Amicus 92 26 22.0% 22.3 18.6% 17.6% 
Without  
Amicus 458 13 2.8% 2.6% 2.1% 2.2% 
There is, of course, an endogeneity concern with this data: larger, more
sophisticated litigants—who are more likely to attract the Court’s attention in
the first place—are more likely to be able to obtain amicus support.  Yet two
observations drawn from my data suggest that amicus briefs play a unique
role in patent cases in particular.  First, as Table 2 above indicates, from 2002
through 2016, two-thirds of the granted cert petitions in Federal Circuit pat-
ent cases (26 of 39) were accompanied by at least one amicus brief.76  By
comparison, in 2002, only 44.6% of granted cert petitions overall (33 of 74)
were accompanied by at least one amicus brief.  In 2010, that figure was
53.3% (32 of 60).  Though the proportion of granted petitions accompanied
73 See PERRY, supra note 21, at 137.
74 Specifically, for the 2002 Term, a paid petition accompanied by at least one amicus
brief was 8.6 times more likely to be granted (22.3% versus 2.6%); for the 2010 Term, 8.9
times more likely (18.6% versus 2.1%); and for the 2016 Term, eight times more likely
(17.6% versus 2.2%).  For studies reporting similar figures, see Larsen & Devins, supra note
69, at 1939 (reporting that, in the 2014 Term, a supporting amicus brief made a cert grant
six times more likely); and Lazarus, supra note 17, at 1528–29 (2005 Term, nearly ten times
more likely).  For more detailed data about of the number of cert-stage amicus brief filings
in the 2002, 2010, and 2016 Terms and corresponding grant rates, see infra Appendix,
Tables A2–A4.
75 Specifically, 7.9 times more likely (22.0% versus 2.8%).  In a study covering 2000
through 2009, Colleen Chien similarly reported that “the Supreme Court was seven times
more likely to grant certiorari [in a patent case] . . . if a third party filed a brief urging the
court to do so.”  Colleen V. Chien, Patent Amicus Briefs: What the Courts’ Friends Can Teach Us
About the Patent System, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 395, 422 & n.161 (2011).
76 One of the thirteen granted cert petitions without any accompanying amicus briefs
was filed by the Solicitor General, who, many studies have noted, enjoys an enormous
advantage in seeking certiorari on behalf of the federal government. See, e.g., PERRY, supra
note 21, at 129.  Excluding that petition from the figures reported in the text, 68.4% of
granted cert petitions in patent cases (26 of 38) were accompanied by at least one amicus
brief.
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by amicus briefs has steadily grown, reaching 60.6% in 2016 (43 of 71), that
figure is still smaller than the comparable figure for patent cases over the
past fifteen Terms.77  Indeed, in more recent years, the proportion of
granted patent petitions accompanied by amicus briefs has grown.  From
2002 through 2009, 7 of 11 granted cert petitions in patent cases (63.6%)
were accompanied by amicus briefs.  From 2010 through 2016, that figure
increased to 19 of 28 (67.9%).
Second, the quantity of amicus briefs filed appears to have a unique rela-
tionship to the likelihood of a cert grant in patent cases as compared to
Supreme Court cases more generally.  Across all types of cases (not just pat-
ent cases), the presence of even a single amicus brief at the cert stage corre-
sponds to a substantial increase in the likelihood of the Court granting
review.  In 2002, for instance, a petition accompanied by just one amicus
brief was over 3.5 times more likely to be granted than the average petition:
the grant rate was 15.1% for petitions accompanied by one amicus brief ver-
sus a grant rate of 4.2% overall.78  In 2010, the presence of a single amicus
brief made a cert grant over four times more likely: 17.2% for petitions
accompanied by one amicus brief versus a grant rate of 4.1% overall.  And, in
2016, the presence of a single amicus brief made a cert grant just over three
times more likely: 13.9% for petitions accompanied by one amicus brief ver-
sus a grant rate of 4.6% overall.79
The data for patent cases looks much different.  As Table 3 below illus-
trates, a patent petition in which only one cert-stage amicus brief is filed is
actually less likely than the average patent petition to be granted: the grant
rate was 6.1% for patent petitions accompanied by one amicus brief as com-
pared to the overall patent-case grant rate of 6.6% reported above.80
77 The difference between the proportion of Federal Circuit patent cases with amicus
briefs and the overall numbers for OT2002 is statistically significant (p = .024).  The
smaller differences between the patent case numbers and the overall numbers for OT2010
and OT2016 are not statistically significant (p = .187 and p = .528, respectively).  But recall
my data represents the entire population of relevant cases during the chosen time periods,
meaning that any difference could arguably be considered significant. See supra note 66.
78 For more details about the number of amicus briefs filed in all cases in the 2002,
2010, and 2016 Terms, see infra Appendix, Tables A2–A4.
79 All of the differences reported in this paragraph are statistically significant (p <
.001).  Studying the 2005 Term, Lazarus similarly found that the presence of a single ami-
cus brief made a cert grant nearly four times more likely: 14.77% for petitions supported
by one amicus brief versus a grant rate of 3.75% overall.  Lazarus, supra note 17, at 1529
tbl.4.
80 See infra p. 1247.
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TABLE 3: CERT-STAGE AMICUS BRIEFS FILED IN FEDERAL CIRCUIT PATENT
CASES, OT2002 THROUGH OT2016
Amicus Briefs Filed Total Denied Granted % Granted 
0 471 458 13 2.8% 
1 49 46 3 6.1% 
2 32 26 6 18.8% 
3 17 12 5 29.4% 
4 7 5 2 28.6% 
5 2 1 1 50.0% 
6 2 0 2 100.0% 
7 2 0 2 100.0% 
8 2 1 1 50.0% 
9 2 0 2 100.0% 
11 2 0 2 100.0% 
22 1 1 0 0.0% 
      
0 or 1 520 504 16 3.1% 
2 to 4 56 43 13 23.2% 
5 or more 13 3 10 76.9% 
The filing of two to four amicus briefs increases the grant rate across all
cases, but the magnitude of the increase is far more pronounced in patent
cases specifically.  In 2002, across all cases, 33.3% of petitions accompanied
by two to four amicus briefs were granted—about double the grant rate of
15.1% for petitions accompanied by a single amicus brief.81  By 2010, how-
ever, the grant rates had become almost identical: 17.4% of petitions accom-
panied by two to four amicus briefs were granted versus a grant rate of 17.2%
for petitions accompanied by a single amicus brief.  In 2016, the percentages
spread apart slightly, but not by much: 17.0% of petitions accompanied by
two to four amicus briefs were granted versus 13.9% of petitions accompa-
nied by a single amicus brief.82
In patent cases, by contrast, the grant rate increases nearly fourfold
when two to four amicus briefs are filed at the cert stage, from 6.1% for cases
with one amicus brief to 23.2% in cases with two to four amicus briefs, as
illustrated on Table 3 above.83  And this is not a function of the granted
patent cases with two to four amicus briefs occurring in an earlier era, when
there was a larger spread in the overall numbers.  Rather, nine of the thir-
81 Again, for more detailed data about amicus brief filings in all cases in the 2002,
2010, and 2016 Terms, see infra Appendix, Tables A2–A4.
82 None of these differences are statistically significant.  Even for the large spread in
2002, p = .155.
83 This difference is statistically significant (p = .012).
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teen granted cases with two to four amicus briefs were granted in the 2010
Term or later.
Patent cases in which five or more amicus briefs are filed at the cert stage
are extremely likely to be granted.  Out of thirteen petitions accompanied by
five or more amicus briefs, the court granted ten (76.9%).  Though we are
dealing with relatively small numbers, that grant rate for patent cases is
roughly double the grant rate across all types of cases (not just patent cases)
with a similarly large number of amicus briefs: in the 2002 Term, the Court
granted 3 of 7 petitions accompanied by five or more amicus briefs (42.9%);
in 2010, 5 of 16 (31.3%); and in 2016, 9 of 23 (39.1%).84
In short, my data confirms the overall correlation between the presence
of amicus briefs at the cert stage and the likelihood of a cert grant.  Most
intriguingly, it suggests that the correlation between the number of amicus
briefs and the likelihood of a cert grant is more important in patent cases
than in other areas of law.
C. The Solicitor General
The Solicitor General is a uniquely influential litigant at the Supreme
Court, both at the cert stage and on the merits.  In patent cases, the Solicitor
General commonly becomes involved when the Court invites the SG to file a
brief expressing the views of the United States.  This happened on 31 of the
589 patent petitions in my dataset, as I discuss in more detail below.85
A call for the views of the Solicitor General is a strong indication that the
Court is interested in a case.86  According to my data, across all types of cases
(not just patent cases), the mere issuance of a CVSG makes it over ten times
more likely that the Court will grant cert.  Though the Court’s overall grant
rate is about 4%,87 from 2002 through 2016, the Court granted 139 of the
308 petitions on which it issued a CVSG, or 45.1%.  (That figure excludes
petitions that were GVR’d or dismissed due to settlement.)  Though the mere
issuance of a CVSG order dramatically increases the likelihood of a cert
grant, the SG’s recommendation does matter: as discussed in more detail
below, the Court follows the SG’s recommendation to grant or deny cert
more than three-quarters of the time.88
In an article published roughly a decade ago, John Duffy highlighted the
Solicitor General’s role in shaping the Supreme Court’s then-nascent docket
of patent cases.89  As Duffy reported, before the 2000 Term, the Court had
84 Lazarus’s study of the 2005 Term reported that 6 out of 10 petitions supported by
five or more amicus briefs were granted. See Lazarus, supra note 17, at 1529.
85 See infra subsection III.A.3.
86 See Stefanie A. Lepore, The Development of the Supreme Court Practice of Calling for the
Views of the Solicitor General, 35 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 35, 38 (2010).
87 See supra Figure 3.
88 See infra Figure 6.
89 See John F. Duffy, The Federal Circuit in the Shadow of the Solicitor General, 78 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 518, 519–20 (2010).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-3\NDL306.txt unknown Seq: 22  6-MAR-20 10:43
1254 notre dame law review [vol. 95:3
issued a CVSG in only one patent case ever.90  In 2000, however, the Court
issued CVSGs in three patent cases,91 and that trend has continued to this
day, right alongside the growing number of patent cases decided on the mer-
its.  From 2000 through 2016, the Court issued an average of 2.18 CVSGs in
Federal Circuit patent cases per Term.  And, from 2004 through 2016, the
Court issued at least one CVSG in a patent case in every Term except one, as
Figure 4 below indicates.92
FIGURE 4: CVSGS IN FEDERAL CIRCUIT PATENT CASES, BY TERM
ORDER WAS ISSUED
The data I have collected neatly illustrates the unusually high degree of
influence the Solicitor General enjoys at the cert stage in patent cases.  As
Figure 5 below shows, on cert petitions in Federal Circuit patent cases that
the Court acted on from the 2002 through the 2016 Terms, the Supreme
Court agreed with the Solicitor General’s recommendation to grant or deny
90 Id. at 525–27.  The case was Barr Laboratories, Inc. v. Burroughs Wellcome Co., 515 U.S.
1130 (1995) (mem.).  Duffy, supra note 89, at 527.
91 Duffy, supra note 89, at 529–30.
92 The analysis that follows, which focuses on patent cases arising out of the Federal
Circuit, excludes one patent-related case arising out of the Ninth Circuit in which the
Court issued a CVSG, Kimble v. Marvel Enterprises., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2719 (2014) (mem.).
Note also that Figure 4 excludes a Federal Circuit case in which the Court issued a CVSG
but that the parties voluntarily dismissed before the SG filed its brief, Maersk Drilling USA,
Inc. v. Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2333 (2014) (mem.), because
voluntary dismissals are excluded from my dataset of Federal Circuit cert petitions. See
supra note 40.  Figure 4 does include, however, one case in which the Court issued a CVSG
but then denied certiorari before the SG filed its brief, Apotex Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 549 U.S. 970
(2006) (mem.) (denying cert after the respondent filed a suggestion of mootness, over the
opposition of the petitioner).
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cert over 90% of the time—in 28 of the 30 cases in which the Solicitor Gen-
eral filed a brief in response to a CVSG.93
FIGURE 5: SUPREME COURT AGREEMENT WITH SOLICITOR GENERAL
RECOMMENDATION ON CERT IN FEDERAL CIRCUIT PATENT CASES WITH A
CVSG, OT2002 THROUGH OT2016
28
(93.3%)
2
(6.7%)
Agree Disagree
93 Figures 5 and 6 treat each cert petition as a separate case (that is, as a separate
instance of agreement or disagreement), even if the Solicitor General filed a single brief
containing recommendations for multiple petitions. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae at 1, Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920 (2015) (Nos. 13-
896, 13-1044), 2014 WL 5299431 (patent case, recommending partial grant of the petition
in No. 13-896 and denial of the cross-petition in No. 13-1044).  Though this methodology
causes some petitions presenting similar or identical questions to be counted multiple
times, see, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 1–8, Chadbourne & Parke
LLP v. Troice, 134 S.Ct. 1058 (2014) (Nos. 12-79, 12-86, 12-88) 2012 WL 6591478
(nonpatent case, recommending denial of three petitions presenting the same question),
the Solicitor General often recommends different actions on different petitions in a single
brief, even if those petitions present the same question, see, e.g., Brief for the United States
as Amicus Curiae at 20, Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 545 U.S.
429 (2005) (Nos. 03-1230, 03-1234, 03-1250) 2004 WL 2985237 (nonpatent case,
recommending different actions on each of three petitions challenging a single decision of
the Michigan Court of Appeals), so counting each petition as a separate case provides, in
my view, the most accurate assessment of the frequency with which the Court agrees or
disagrees with the Solicitor General’s recommendation.  It also bears noting that, in the
patent-related Kimble case arising out of the Ninth Circuit, mentioned above, see supra
notes 64, 92, the SG recommended denying certiorari, but the Court granted it.  Including
that instance of disagreement would drop the agreement rate reported on Figure 5 from
93.3% to 90.3%—still notably higher than the overall agreement rate indicated below. See
infra Figure 6.  Lastly, it is worth noting that the Supreme Court issued two CVSG orders in
Federal Circuit patent cases in the 2016 Term that the Court did not dispose of until the
2017 Term.  In both of those cases, the Court agreed with the SG’s recommendation. See
WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 138 S. Ct. 734 (2018) (mem.) (granting
cert); Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 138 S. Ct. 420 (2017) (mem.) (denying cert).
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By contrast, the data I have collected for all cases indicates that the
Court agrees with the Solicitor General’s recommendation slightly less than
80% of the time, as shown on Figure 6 below.94  This difference in the agree-
ment rate between patent cases with a CVSG and all cases with a CVSG is
statistically significant at the 1% level (p = .008).
FIGURE 6: SUPREME COURT AGREEMENT WITH SOLICITOR GENERAL
RECOMMENDATION ON CERT IN ALL CASES WITH A CVSG,
OT2002 THROUGH OT2016
232
(78.9%)
62
(21.1%)
Agree Disagree
Interestingly, the Solicitor General’s sway in patent cases has held steady
over time, even as the SG’s influence overall appears to have decreased.  The
Court has disagreed with the SG’s recommendation on cert in only two Fed-
eral Circuit patent cases ever, one in which the Court acted on the cert peti-
tion in the 2005 Term95 and another in 2012.96  Yet, looking at all cases
Including those two cases would push the Court-SG agreement rate in patent cases even
higher.
94 A prior study using data from 1998 through 2004 reported a similar agreement rate
of 78.5%.  David C. Thompson & Melanie F. Wachtell, An Empirical Analysis of Supreme Court
Certiorari Petition Procedures: The Call for Response and the Call for the Views of the Solicitor Gen-
eral, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 237, 275–76 (2009).  Like that study, the results reported on
Figures 5 and 6 are limited to cases in which the Solicitor General recommended a straight
grant or denial and not, say, a recommendation to GVR or to hold the petition pending
resolution of another case.
95 Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 546 U.S. 999 (2005) (mem.)
(granting cert over the SG’s recommendation to deny).  Ironically, the Court ultimately
dismissed the writ of certiorari in that case as improvidently granted.  Lab. Corp. of Am.
Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 125 (2006) (mem.) (per curiam).
96 Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 568 U.S. 936 (2012) (mem.) (granting cert over the SG’s
recommendation to deny); see also supra notes 64, 92 (discussing Kimble v. Marvel Entertain-
ment, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401 (2015), a patent-related case arising from the Ninth Circuit in
which the Supreme Court granted cert over the SG’s recommendation to deny).
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involving a CVSG order during the time period of my study, the Court has
become far more likely to disagree with the SG’s recommendation.  As Figure
7 below indicates, in not a single Term from 2002 through 2008 did the
Court disagree with the SG’s recommendation in more than 20% of cases
overall, and the disagreement rate was often below 10%.  From 2009 through
2016, however, the disagreement rate grew markedly: the Court disagreed
with the SG’s recommendation over 25% of the time in five of the eight
Terms during that time period.
FIGURE 7: SUPREME COURT AGREEMENT WITH SOLICITOR GENERAL
RECOMMENDATION ON CERT IN ALL CASES WITH A CVSG, TERM BY TERM
19
11 10
19
14
17 17 16
21
13
11
17
10
18 19
2
(9.5%)
2
(15.4%) 2
(16.7%)
1
(5.0%)
2
(12.5%)
1
(5.6%)
4
(19.0%)
8
(33.3%)
4
(16.0%)
7
(35.0%)
10
(47.6%)
7
(29.2)%
6
(37.5%)
3
(14.3%)
3
(13.6%)
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Agree Disagree
It is worth noting that the increase in disagreement rate beginning in
2009 coincides with a switch from a Republican presidential administration
(and a Republican-appointed Solicitor General) to a Democratic one.  Ignor-
ing the Terms during which control of the White House changed political
parties (2008 and 2016), the disagreement rate from 2002 through 2007 was
a mere 10.0% (10 of 100), but from 2009 through 2015 it was nearly three
times higher—29.8% (45 of 151).  This difference is statistically significant at
the 1% level (p < .001).  As I explain in greater detail in a companion essay to
this Article,97 this development challenges the conventional wisdom that the
Justices are strongly inclined to follow the SG’s cert recommendation even if
they disagree with the SG ideologically.98  Instead, my findings are consistent
97 Paul R. Gugliuzza, Supreme Court Ideology and Deference to the Solicitor General
(Jan. 14, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
98 See, e.g., RYAN C. BLACK & RYAN J. OWENS, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT 58, 66 (2012) (relying on data from 1970 through 1993).
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with recent empirical literature demonstrating the decline of Supreme Court
deference to the President.99
Returning to patent cases—and in view of the Supreme Court’s growing
docket of patent disputes—it bears mention that the SG recommends the
Court grant certiorari in a greater percentage of patent cases than overall.
Specifically, the SG recommended a grant in 13 of the 30 Federal Circuit
patent cases (43.3%) in which it filed a brief in response to a CVSG from
2002 through 2016, versus 80 of 294 cases overall (27.2%).100  In addition,
the Court granted every single patent petition the SG recommended grant-
ing.101  Thus, even if the SG’s influence is declining overall, the SG’s influ-
ence at the cert stage in patent cases seems alive and well.
* * *
This Part of the Article has made three primary points.  First, the
Supreme Court’s interest in patent cases has grown in the past two decades,
both in terms of the raw number of cases on the docket and the likelihood of
a cert petition in a patent case being granted.  Second, the presence of ami-
cus briefs—and in particular the number of them—appears to be an impor-
tant indicator of the likelihood of cert being granted in a patent case,
perhaps more important than in other areas of law.  And third, the Solicitor
General’s recommendation seems to play a vital role in the Supreme Court’s
decision whether to grant cert in a patent case—again possibly even more
than in other areas of law.  In the next Part of the Article, I introduce an
additional development that corresponds to the Court’s increasing tendency
to grant cert in patent cases: the more frequent presence of elite Supreme
Court litigators in patent disputes.
III. THE SUPREME COURT BAR AT THE BAR OF PATENTS
To begin, some background on the Supreme Court bar.102  During the
nineteenth century, a small group of lawyers, including Daniel Webster, Fran-
cis Scott Key, and Luther Martin, dominated oral argument at the Supreme
Court.103  This was mostly a function of geography.  At the time, it was simply
too difficult for leading lawyers in New York or Boston to travel to Washing-
ton, D.C.  As travel became easier in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
99 See Lee Epstein & Eric A. Posner, The Decline of Supreme Court Deference to the President,
166 U. PA. L. REV. 829, 846–47, 847 n.75 (2018) (finding that, in cases decided on the
merits, the executive branch’s win rate steadily declined from 77% in 1980 to 48% in
2015).
100 Because of the relatively small numbers, this difference is not statistically significant
(p = .101), but, again, the figures reported in the text represent the entire population of
relevant cases, not a sample.
101 In the overall dataset, the Supreme Court disregarded the SG’s grant recommenda-
tion in 4 of 294 cases (1.4%).  A small fraction, to be sure, but not zero.
102 For a detailed recounting of this story, see KEVIN T. MCGUIRE, THE SUPREME COURT
BAR: LEGAL ELITES IN THE WASHINGTON COMMUNITY 12–27 (1993).
103 See id. at 13–15.
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century, the Supreme Court bar lost its cohesiveness.104  For most of the
twentieth century, there were few if any private lawyers who had a significant,
sustained Supreme Court practice.  That began to change in the 1980s as
veterans of the Solicitor General’s office began to form their own private
practices specializing in appellate and Supreme Court litigation.105  Those
specialized practices were, and mostly still are, housed within large law firms,
though there are some small firms (and, increasingly, law school clinics)
dedicated entirely to appellate and Supreme Court practice.106
By many accounts, this specialized private bar has reformed the
Supreme Court’s agenda by encouraging the Court to hear more cases of
interest to the business community, and it has reshaped the law by obtaining
numerous rulings in favor of its clients, which are often the largest corpora-
tions in the world.107  As I show below, the elite bar also appears to have been
successful at enticing the Supreme Court to hear more patent cases.  Those
lawyers’ ultimate impact on the substance of patent law is, however, less clear,
in part because decisions on the merits in patent cases often involve elite
lawyers on both sides of the dispute.
A. The Growth of the Elite Supreme Court Bar
Figure 8 below presents empirical evidence showing how a small number
of lawyers are increasingly dominating Supreme Court litigation generally.
As that figure illustrates, the number of advocates who qualify as elite under
this Article’s definition (five or more arguments in the Term under review
and the ten preceding Terms, combined) has steadily grown from 2002
through the present, from a low of fifty-three lawyers in 2003 to a high of
eighty-one lawyers in 2016—an increase of 52.8%.108
104 See id. at 19.
105 As Lazarus reports, this trend began in 1985 when Sidley Austin hired Rex Lee,
President Reagan’s first Solicitor General, to create a Supreme Court and appellate prac-
tice in the firm’s D.C. office.  Lazarus, supra note 17, at 1498.  After Lee presented oral
argument in a remarkable six cases in the 1986 Term, other firms quickly followed suit by
hiring former Solicitors General Ken Starr (Kirkland & Ellis), Seth Waxman (Wilmer Cut-
ler), Ted Olson (Gibson Dunn), and Drew Days (Morrison & Foerster), as well as Starr’s
Principal Deputy Solicitor General, John Roberts (Hogan & Hartson). Id. at 1498–500.
106 Well-known small firms dedicated to appellate and Supreme Court practice and
staffed by elite Supreme Court lawyers include Kellogg, Hansen, Todd, Figel & Frederick
(David Frederick, among others) and Goldstein & Russell (Tom Goldstein, among others).
The most successful law school clinic focused on Supreme Court advocacy is at Stanford
Law School and is directed by elite Supreme Court lawyers Jeff Fisher and Pam Karlan.
107 Lazarus, supra note 17, at 1490–91; accord Biskupic et al., supra note 16.
108 For another empirical analysis presenting evidence of increased specialization
among Supreme Court advocates, see Tonja Jacobi & Matthew Sag, The New Oral Argument:
Justices as Advocates, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1161, 1201 (2019) (showing a decline in the
number of different advocates presenting oral argument at the Supreme Court starting in
the mid-1980s).
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FIGURE 8: NUMBER OF LAWYERS WITH FIVE OR MORE ORAL ARGUMENTS IN
CURRENT AND TEN PRECEDING TERMS, OT2002 THROUGH OT2016
Of course, the Office of the Solicitor General has always provided a
group of lawyers specializing in Supreme Court litigation, and many of those
lawyers are captured on Figure 8.  The growth of a dominating, elite private
bar is more apparent if we amend the definition of elite and exclude argu-
ments that a lawyer conducted while employed by the government.  Under
that definition, the number of advocates who qualify as elite has grown from
twenty-two in 2002, 2003, and 2004 to thirty-nine in 2016—an increase of
77.3%, as depicted in Figure 9 below.
FIGURE 9: NUMBER OF LAWYERS WITH FIVE OR MORE ORAL ARGUMENTS IN
CURRENT AND TEN PRECEDING TERMS, EXCLUDING CASES ARGUED AS A
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE, OT2002 THROUGH OT2016
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In the analysis that follows, I include all oral arguments in determining
whether a lawyer qualifies as elite, on the rationale that a Supreme Court
argument in any capacity helps the lawyer develop expertise and the reputa-
tion among the Justices and their law clerks that could influence the Court’s
decisionmaking.
Perhaps most revealing about the emergence of an elite private sector
Supreme Court bar is Figure 10 below.  It shows the percentage of all
Supreme Court oral arguments that were delivered by elite advocates on a
Term-by-Term basis, excluding arguments presented by attorneys employed
by the government.109  As that figure illustrates, as recently as 2005, less than
a quarter of the private sector lawyers presenting oral argument at the
Supreme Court met my definition of elite.  A decade later, that proportion
had doubled: in both the 2015 and 2016 Terms, 47% of all private sector
lawyers presenting oral argument at the Supreme Court qualified as elite.110
FIGURE 10: PERCENTAGE OF NONGOVERNMENT LAWYERS PRESENTING ORAL
ARGUMENT WHO QUALIFIED AS ELITE, OT2002 THROUGH OT2016
B. The Supreme Court Bar in Patent Cases: At the Cert Stage
1. Elites and the Growing Supreme Court Patent Docket
The transformation of the Supreme Court bar and the Court’s docket
raises the question of central relevance to this Article: Has the elite Supreme
Court bar spurred the Court to hear more patent cases, too?  Patent law
109 For example, lawyers in the Office of the Solicitor General, lawyers working in a
state attorney general’s office, city and county prosecutors, and state and federal public
defenders.
110 A linear regression of the data underlying Figure 10 shows statistical significance
(p < .001) and a positive slope (b = .020).
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would certainly qualify as a topic of interest to the large corporations often
represented by elite Supreme Court lawyers—at least more than other staples
of the Supreme Court’s docket, such as criminal law, criminal procedure,
habeas corpus, and civil rights litigation.
My data indicates that the elite Supreme Court bar has become increas-
ingly involved in patent cases in recent years, most importantly, at the cert
stage.  Figure 11 below shows the proportion of cert petitions in Federal Cir-
cuit patent cases filed by elite advocates from 2002 through 2016.111  As that
figure illustrates, as recently as a decade ago, the number of patent petitions
filed by elite advocates was small—rarely much more than 10% in any given
Term.  Of the 283 cert petitions filed in Federal Circuit patent cases from
2002 through 2009, only twenty-nine (10.2%) were filed by elite advocates.
Since then, however, the elite bar’s involvement in patent cases has become
more than twice as frequent.  From 2010 through 2016, elite lawyers filed 67
of the 305 cert petitions in Federal Circuit patent cases (22.0%).  This differ-
ence is statistically significant at the 1% level (p < .001).
FIGURE 11: CERT PETITIONS IN FEDERAL CIRCUIT PATENT CASES FILED BY
ELITE/NONELITE ADVOCATES, OT2002 THROUGH OT2016
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The increase in the proportion of cert petitions filed by elite advocates
neatly corresponds to the Supreme Court’s increased tendency to grant cert
in patent cases, as discussed above and summarized on Table 4 below, which
compares the percentage of cert petitions in Federal Circuit patent cases
filed by elite lawyers with the Court’s grant rate in patent cases.  Like the
increased participation of elite lawyers, the Court’s increased proclivity to
111 The analysis in this part of the Article excludes the one cert petition in my dataset
that was filed by the Solicitor General (which the Court granted), Kappos v. Hyatt, 566 U.S.
431 (2012).
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grant cert in patent cases is statistically significant at the 1% level (p =
.009).112
TABLE 4: CERT PETITIONS IN FEDERAL CIRCUIT PATENT CASES,
OT2002 THROUGH OT2016
 % Filed by Elites % Granted 
2002–2009 10.2% 3.9% 
2010–2016 22.0% 9.2% 
The correlation between the increasing involvement of elite lawyers and
the growth of the Supreme Court’s patent docket does not, of course, prove
causation.  Yet aspects of my data suggest that elite advocates have influenced
the Court to hear more patent cases.  As Table 5 below shows, from 2002
through 2016, the Supreme Court granted 15.6% of cert petitions filed by
elite advocates in Federal Circuit patent cases as compared to only 4.7% of
petitions filed by nonelites in Federal Circuit patent cases, another difference
that is statistically significant at the 1% level (p = .005).113  Put slightly differ-
ently: the Supreme Court is 3.3 times more likely to grant cert when a peti-
tion in a Federal Circuit patent case is filed by an elite advocate as compared
to a nonelite.114
TABLE 5: GRANT RATES ON CERT PETITIONS IN FEDERAL CIRCUIT PATENT
CASES, OT2002 THROUGH OT2016
 Elite Nonelite 
Granted 15 23 
Denied 81 469 
% Granted 15.6% 4.7% 
Another way of quantifying the success that elite lawyers have had in
shaping the Supreme Court patent docket: From 2002 through 2016, cert
petitions filed by elite lawyers accounted for 16.3% of the petitions filed in
Federal Circuit patent cases, as one can calculate from Table 5 above and as
illustrated on Figure 12 below.  Yet, as Figure 13 indicates, petitions filed by
elite lawyers accounted for nearly 40% of the petitions granted by the
112 See supra Figure 2 and accompanying text for more detailed discussion of the data
underlying Table 4.
113 The overall grant rate for Federal Circuit patent cases was 6.6%, as discussed above.
See supra p. 1247.
114 Excluding the forty-three petitions in my dataset (all denied) that were filed pro se
(even though some of those litigants appear to be lawyers themselves), elite lawyers still
enjoy a grant rate over three times as large as nonelites (15.6% versus 5.1%), and the
difference between elites and nonelites remains statistically significant at the 1% level (p =
.008).
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Supreme Court in Federal Circuit patent cases (15 of 38).  That difference is,
again, statistically significant at the 1% level (p = .007).
FIGURE 12: CERT PETITIONS FILED IN FEDERAL CIRCUIT PATENT CASES,
OT2002 THROUGH OT2016
96
(16.3%)
492
(83.7%)
Elite Nonelite
FIGURE 13:  CERT PETITIONS GRANTED IN FEDERAL CIRCUIT PATENT CASES,
OT2002 THROUGH OT2016
15
(39.5%)
23
(60.5%)
Elite Nonelite
Of course, it is possible that causation may run the opposite direction
from what I have suggested:  that is, the Supreme Court may not be inter-
ested in patent cases because of elite lawyers; rather, elite lawyers may have
gravitated toward patent cases because the Supreme Court became interested
in patent law.  But elite lawyers have been disproportionately involved in
granted patent cases from the very beginning of the Supreme Court’s recent
surge of interest in the field.  Of the eleven patent cases the Court granted
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from 2002 through 2009, elite lawyers served as counsel of record on four, or
36.4%—roughly in line with the 39.5% figure reported on Figure 13 for the
entire time period of my study.  And although elite lawyers have become
modestly more successful at obtaining cert over the years, the difference is
slight and not statistically significant.  From 2002 through 2009, the Court
granted 4 of the 29 cert petitions in patent cases filed by elite lawyers
(13.8%).  From 2010 to 2016, the Court granted 11 of 67 (16.4%).115  Moreo-
ver, in the 2002 and 2003 Terms—the two earliest Terms in my dataset and
two of the five Terms in which the Court granted cert in zero patent cases—
elite lawyers were noticeably absent from patent cases, filing only 3 of the 67
cert petitions in those Terms, or 4.5%—far below 16.3% rate of elite partici-
pation for the entire period of my study, as reported on Figure 12.  In short,
even if the Court’s increased interest in patent law has driven the elite bar to
patent cases in recent years, this data suggests that the Court’s initial interest in
patent law—particularly from 2004 through 2009—was linked to the new-
found presence of elite lawyers in patent cases.
2. Elites and Amicus Briefs
As discussed above, cert petitions accompanied by amicus briefs are
about eight times more likely to be granted than petitions filed without ami-
cus briefs, and that general observation holds true for patent cases.  Moreo-
ver, in patent cases, the sheer number of amicus briefs filed appears to have
unusual importance.  Thus, the ability to “wrangle” amicus briefs out of sym-
pathetic parties—important in all types of Supreme Court litigation116—
appears to have an even greater importance in patent cases.
The ability to recruit amici is, in fact, a key benefit of hiring elite
Supreme Court counsel.  As Allison Orr Larsen and Neal Devins note in their
exploration of what they term the “amicus machine,” the notion that amicus
briefs in Supreme Court cases are “organically developed by concerned inter-
est groups” is outdated and incomplete.117  Rather, Larsen and Devins
explain, sophisticated, expert Supreme Court counsel actively recruit amici
and coordinate their message to the Court.118  Larsen and Devins highlight
the role of the person they call the “amicus wrangler”: a lawyer who solicits
supportive amicus briefs from sympathetic businesses or organizations—
“much like a trial lawyer . . . selecting a roster of expert witnesses for trial.”119
The amicus wrangler is sometimes the counsel of record, sometimes another
lawyer on the team, but always a seasoned Supreme Court advocate in his or
her own right.120
115 p = .743.
116 See Larsen & Devins, supra note 69, at 1919–20.
117 Id. at 1905–06.
118 Id. at 1906.
119 Id. at 1922.
120 See id. at 1922–24.
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Perhaps not surprisingly, my data indicates that elite advocates’ success
at wrangling amicus briefs carries over to patent cases.  As Table 6 below
indicates, at least one cert-stage amicus brief was filed in 51.0% (49 of 96) of
Federal Circuit patent cases in which the petitioner’s counsel of record was
an elite advocate, and two or more briefs were filed nearly a third of the time
(in 31 of 96 cases, or 32.3%).  (As Table 3 above indicated, the presence of
two or more amicus briefs makes a cert petition in a patent case over five
times more likely than average to be granted.)121  By comparison, at least
one amicus brief was filed in only 14.0% (69 of 492) of Federal Circuit patent
cases in which the petitioner was not represented by elite counsel, and in
only 7.5% of those cases (37 of 492) were more than two amicus briefs
filed.122
Though elite counsel are significantly more likely to elicit (or, better,
solicit) amicus briefs and to have their petitions granted, my data also indi-
cates that a large number of amicus briefs can negate the advantage enjoyed
by elite lawyers.  Even the presence of one cert-stage amicus brief closes the
gap between elite and nonelite grant rates substantially.  As Table 6 below
shows, of the 49 elite petitions accompanied by at least one amicus brief, the
Court granted 13, or 26.5%.  By contrast, of the 69 nonelite petitions accom-
panied by at least one amicus brief, the Court also granted 13, or 18.8%.
That gap is much smaller than it is across all patent cases (a 15.6% grant rate
for elites versus a 4.7% grant rate for nonelites), and it is not statistically
significant (p = .335).
Focusing on petitions accompanied by two or more amicus briefs, the
elite bar’s advantage almost entirely disappears (though the numbers begin
to get small).  From 2002 through 2016, the Court granted 34.4% (11 of 32)
of petitions filed by elite advocates and accompanied by two or more amicus
briefs.  By comparison, the Court granted 32.4% (12 of 37) petitions filed by
nonelites and accompanied by two or more amicus briefs.
121 Specifically, the Court granted 33.3% of patent cert petitions accompanied by two
or more amicus briefs (23 of 69) versus an overall grant rate of 6.6% in patent cases.
122 Both of these differences are statistically significant (p < .001).
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TABLE 6: CERT PETITIONS IN FEDERAL CIRCUIT PATENT CASES, OT2002
THROUGH OT2016:  ELITES, NONELITES, AND AMICI
Petitions Filed by Elite Advocates 
 
Total With at Least One  
Amicus Brief 
With Two or More  
Amicus Briefs 
Filed 96 49 32 
Granted 15 13 11 
% Granted 15.6% 26.5% 34.4% 
  
Petitions Filed by Nonelite Advocates 
 
Total With at Least One  
Amicus Brief 
With Two or More  
Amicus Briefs 
Filed 492 69 37 
Granted 23 13 12 
% Granted 4.7% 18.8% 32.4% 
3. Elites and CVSGs
As discussed above, a CVSG order makes it over ten times more likely
that the Supreme Court will grant cert across all types of cases.  In Federal
Circuit patent cases specifically, the effect of a CVSG is less pronounced, but
still significant.  From 2002 through 2016, the Court granted 46.7% (14 of
30) of Federal Circuit patent cases in which it issued a CVSG and the SG filed
a brief—a little more than seven times higher than the overall patent-case
grant rate of 6.6%.
That leads to more potentially bad news for nonelite advocates: cert peti-
tions filed by elite advocates in Federal Circuit patent cases are far more
likely to elicit a CVSG than petitions filed by nonelites.  As shown on Figure
14 below, the Court issued a CVSG on 14 of the 96 cert petitions filed by elite
advocates in my dataset (14.6%) as compared to 17 of the 492 cert petitions
filed by nonelites (3.5%), a difference that is statistically significant at the 1%
level (p = .003).  (Elites’ advantage would be even higher if I included a fif-
teenth petition that obtained a CVSG but was voluntarily dismissed by the
parties before the SG filed its brief.)123
Interestingly, though petitions filed by elite advocates are four times
more likely to elicit a CVSG, the Solicitor General’s proclivity to recommend
granting or denying cert is not significantly different for elite versus nonelite
petitions.  On petitions filed by elite advocates, the Solicitor General recom-
mended granting cert in 6 of its 14 briefs; on petitions filed by nonelites, the
Solicitor General recommended granting cert in 6 of 16 briefs.  (One none-
123 Maersk Drilling USA, Inc. v. Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc., 134 S.
Ct. 2333 (2014) (mem.).  As explained above, however, I exclude voluntary dismissals from
my dataset of cert petitions in Federal Circuit cases.  See supra note 40.
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lite petition in my dataset of Federal Circuit cert petitions that obtained a
CVSG was denied before the SG filed its brief.)124
FIGURE 14: CVSG ORDERS AND SOLICITOR GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS ON
CERT PETITIONS IN FEDERAL CIRCUIT PATENT CASES,
OT2002 THROUGH OT2016
Though these are small numbers, they have at least two possible implica-
tions.  First, they suggest that the Solicitor General’s recommendation is
unaffected by the identity of the lawyer on the cert petition.  This is impor-
tant because many members of the elite Supreme Court bar formerly worked
in the Office of the Solicitor General.  It would therefore not have been sur-
prising to find that lawyers in that office are more inclined to recommend a
grant when a petition is filed by a former colleague than when it is filed by an
unfamiliar lawyer.  My data suggests, however, that any concern about a
revolving door or capture is trumped by other considerations—perhaps most
notably the office’s oft-stated desire to preserve its reputation with the Jus-
tices as a neutral voice about the desirability of review.125  A second possibil-
ity is that, despite the disparity in the frequency of CVSGs in cases filed by
elites versus nonelites, the Court is doing a relatively good job at identifying
cases that are at least plausibly worthy of review.  Hence, the Solicitor Gen-
124 Apotex Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 549 U.S. 970 (2006) (mem.) (denying cert after the
respondent filed a suggestion of mootness, over the opposition of the petitioner).
125 See, e.g., Rex E. Lee, Lawyering for the Government: Politics, Polemics & Principle, 47
OHIO ST. L.J. 595, 597 (1986) (“[T]here is a widely held, and I believe substantially accu-
rate, impression that the Solicitor General’s office provides the Court from one administra-
tion to another—and largely without regard to either the political party or the personality
of the particular Solicitor General—with advocacy which is more objective, more dispas-
sionate, more competent, and more respectful of the Court as an institution than it gets
from any other lawyer or group of lawyers.”).
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eral recommends a grant in roughly the same proportion of CVSG cases
regardless of whether the petition is filed by an elite or nonelite.
C. The Supreme Court Bar in Patent Cases: On the Merits, Briefly
By many accounts, Supreme Court patent law has taken a decidedly
“antipatent” turn over the past two decades.126  On first blush, it is tempting
to attribute that development to the elite Supreme Court bar.  My data indi-
cates that elite lawyers disproportionately seek review on behalf of accused
infringers (as opposed to patentees), who would stand to benefit from
caselaw that makes it easier to challenge patent validity and to defeat a claim
of infringement.  Of the 38 cert petitions in my dataset that were filed by
private parties and that the Court granted, 26 (68.4%) were filed by an
accused infringer, as compared to only 12 that were filed by a patentee or
patent applicant.  But 80% of the granted petitions filed by elite lawyers (12
of 15) were on behalf of accused infringers.  Nonelite lawyers, by contrast,
represented accused infringers only 60.9% of the time (in 14 of 23 cases).
That difference, however, is not statistically significant (p = .208).
Moreover, elite lawyers’ disproportionate success at obtaining review
does not translate to disproportionate success on the merits.  Part of the rea-
son is that the merits stage of Supreme Court patent cases not infrequently
involves elite lawyers on both sides.  As Table 7 below indicates, 13 of the 41
patent-related cases that were orally argued from 2002 through 2017127
(31.7%) featured elite advocates on both sides—either conducting oral argu-
ment, as counsel of record on the primary merits brief, or both.128  Another
126 See, e.g., Gregory N. Mandel, Institutional Fracture in Intellectual Property Law: The
Supreme Court Versus Congress, 102 MINN. L. REV. 803, 808, 811–12 (2017) (finding that 23 of
the 29 Supreme Court patent decisions from the 2002 Term through the 2015 Term “sub-
stantively affected patentee rights in a measurable direction” and that 18 of those 23 deci-
sions “weakened patent protection”). But cf. Timothy R. Holbrook, The Supreme Court’s
Quiet Revolution in Induced Patent Infringement, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1007, 1009 & n.8
(2016) (noting that several recent Supreme Court decisions on induced infringement
“have favored the patent owner for the most part” and citing additional examples of “pro-
patent rulings”).
127 The total number of orally argued cases in this Section is different than the number
of Federal Circuit cert petitions granted (discussed elsewhere in this Article) for several
reasons.  First, I include the case in which the cert petition was filed by the Solicitor Gen-
eral, see supra note 111, when discussing merits cases.  Second, two pairs of Federal Circuit
cases in my dataset were argued in tandem at the Supreme Court by the same lawyers, and
each pair was decided in a single opinion: Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1664 (2017)
(consolidated with Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., No. 15-1195); and Halo Electronics, Inc. v.
Pulse Electronics, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016) (consolidated with Stryker Corp. v. Zimmer,
Inc., No. 14-1520).  I treat each pair as a single case in this Section.  Third, I include in my
discussion of merits cases the three patent-related cases that the Court decided from 2002
through 2017 that originated outside of the Federal Circuit. See supra note 64.  Finally, I
include a case in which the cert petition was granted and the case was decided in the 2017
Term.  WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 138 S. Ct. 2129 (2018).
128 For this Section, I treat elite advocates in private practice separately from elite advo-
cates in the Office of the Solicitor General.
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10 cases (24.4%) featured nonelite advocates on both sides.  Five cases fea-
tured nonelite advocates squaring off against lawyers from the Office of the
Solicitor General, with the SG’s lawyers winning three times, and the private
advocate winning twice.  In only 13 of 41 cases (31.7%) did an elite advocate
square off against a nonelite.  Nonelite advocates actually enjoyed a slight
edge in those cases, prevailing 7 out of 13 times.
TABLE 7: ELITE AND NONELITE ADVOCATES IN SUPREME COURT PATENT CASES
HEARD ON THE MERITS, OT2002 THROUGH OT2017
Cases Wins 
Elite v. Elite 13 – 
Nonelite v. Nonelite 10 – 
Elite v. Nonelite 13 Elite 6, Nonelite 7 
Nonelite v. Solicitor General 5 Nonelite 2, SG 3 
Prior studies examining whether experience as a Supreme Court litiga-
tor translates into favorable results on the merits have reached mixed
results.129  My findings are consistent with that ambiguity.
* * *
The Supreme Court bar has arrived at the bar of patents.  The increas-
ing proportion of cert petitions in patent cases filed by elite advocates neatly
corresponds with the growing number of patent cases being decided by the
Supreme Court on the merits.  Though elite advocates seem to have helped
reshape the Court’s agenda in patent law, it is not clear that they are respon-
sible for changing the substance of patent law in any consistent way.
IV. LIMITATIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND NEXT STEPS
It bears repeating that the correlation between elite lawyers’ increasing
participation in Supreme Court patent cases and the Supreme Court’s grow-
ing patent docket suggests but does not prove causation.  As noted in the
Introduction, many factors have likely played a role in spurring the Court to
hear more patent cases.130  The main objective of this Article has been to
inject an additional consideration into the discussion: the identity of the law-
yers seeking Supreme Court review.
129 Compare Andrea McAtee & Kevin T. McGuire, Lawyers, Justices, and Issue Salience:
When and How Do Legal Arguments Affect the U.S. Supreme Court?, 41 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 259,
275 (2007) (finding that experienced Supreme Court litigators win more frequently than
novices in cases without strong ideological valence), with Ryan C. Black & Ryan J. Owens,
The Success of Former Solicitors General in Private Practice: Costly and Unnecessary?, 2016 MICH.
ST. L. REV. 325, 327 (finding that the Court is no more likely to rule in favor of an attorney
who formerly worked in the Office of the Solicitor General than an attorney with a similar
level of experience who did not work in that office).
130 See supra notes 7–15 and accompanying text.
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The elite bar’s involvement in patent cases may, in fact, be inextricably
intertwined with the other factors causing the Court’s patent docket to grow,
creating a sort of “chicken or egg” problem.  For instance, the major spike in
Supreme Court patent decisions began in the 2010 Term,131 the Term dur-
ing which Congress passed the America Invents Act132—the most significant
revision to the patent laws in over half a century.  The Act, as noted, has
provided the basis for several recent Supreme Court decisions and numerous
cert petitions.133  Yet the Act was itself a response to the increasing quantity
and prominence of patent litigation,134 as reflected in the fourteen Supreme
Court patent decisions in the decade preceding the Act—many of which
were handled by elite lawyers.135
There is also an endogeneity concern in trying to draw a causal link
between the presence of elite advocates and the Supreme Court’s increased
tendency to grant cert in patent cases.  Parties who think they have a good
chance of obtaining cert might be more willing to pay the high fees of an
elite lawyer,136 and the parties who can afford to hire an elite lawyer (mostly
large corporations) might be those most likely to attract the Court’s attention
in the first place.137  Relatedly, an elite lawyer might be more willing to take a
case (perhaps even without a fee)138 if the lawyer thinks the case has a strong
chance of obtaining cert.  In short, it could be that the substance of the cases
is dispositive; elite lawyers just end up being associated with the cases that are
most cert worthy.
Yet there remain good reasons to think that having an elite lawyer makes
a difference to the Court’s decisionmaking at the cert stage, even if it is not
the only factor.  For starters, the data above illustrates that elite lawyers are
remarkably able at obtaining amicus support for their cert petitions.  The fact
that elite lawyers’ advantage in obtaining cert largely disappears when we
131 See supra Figure 1.
132 Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 35 U.S.C.).
133 See supra notes 14–15 and accompanying text.
134 See H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, at 39 (2011) (“[T]he need to modernize our patent laws
has found expression in the courts, as well.  The Supreme Court has reversed the Federal
Circuit in six of the patent-related cases that it has heard since the beginning of the 109th
Congress.”).
135 Specifically, five of the fourteen granted petitions in patent cases from 2004
through 2010, or 35.7%, featured elite advocates as counsel of record, only slightly below
the 39.5% rate of elite representation on all granted patent petitions in my study. See supra
Figure 13.
136 See David Lat, Top Supreme Court Advocates Charge How Much Per Hour?, ABOVE L.
(Aug. 10, 2015), https://abovethelaw.com/2015/08/top-supreme-court-advocates-charge-
how-much-per-hour.
137 See Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Court Inc., N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Mar. 16, 2008), https://
www.nytimes.com/2008/03/16/magazine/16supreme-t.html.
138 See Lazarus, supra note 17, at 1557 (noting that Supreme Court advocates often take
cases pro bono or for reduced fees because “they bolster the attorney’s overall credentials
as a Supreme Court practitioner for those cases that do have the potential for generating
significant fees”).
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examine only petitions accompanied by amicus briefs139 suggests that elite
lawyers’ exceptional ability to wrangle amicus support may be the most
important explanation for their disproportionate success in obtaining cert in
patent cases.
Moreover, there have been several situations in which the Court has
passed on issues when presented by nonelites but then granted the same
issue when presented by an elite.  For example, over the course of more than
a decade, the Court received numerous petitions seeking review of Federal
Circuit precedent holding that patent claim construction is a pure question
of law subject to de novo review on appeal.140  The Court finally granted
review on that issue (and overturned the Federal Circuit’s precedent) in a
case in which petitioner’s counsel of record was a member of the elite.141
Similarly, over roughly the same time period, the Court received many peti-
tions involving the scope and applicability of the statutory presumption of
patent validity found in 35 U.S.C. § 282,142 which the Federal Circuit had
long held required a patent challenger to prove invalidity by clear and con-
vincing evidence.143  The Court denied all of those petitions, but, in 2010, it
granted a petition—filed by an elite lawyer—that broadly presented the ques-
tion of whether § 282 carries with it a clear and convincing standard of
proof.144  Despite that decision at the cert stage in favor of an elite lawyer,
the Court ultimately affirmed the Federal Circuit’s precedent145 (a somewhat
unusual outcome).146  And during the late 1990s and early 2000s the Court
received several petitions challenging Federal Circuit case law that had ren-
dered the patent-eligible subject matter requirement effectively a dead let-
ter.147  But the Court refrained from granting cert on that issue until 2005,
when it granted a petition filed by an elite lawyer that did not even explicitly
139 See supra Table 6.
140 See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Memorex Prods. Inc. v. SanDisk Corp., 546
U.S. 1076 (2005) (mem.) (No. 05-546), 2005 WL 2508049.
141 Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 835 (2015); see also Petition
for a Writ of Certiorari, Teva, 135 S. Ct. 831 (No. 13-854), 2014 WL 230926 (William Jay).
142 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012) (“A patent shall be presumed valid. . . . The burden of
establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof shall rest on the party asserting such
invalidity.”).
143 See, e.g., Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Ga.-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 531
U.S. 816 (2000) (mem.) (No. 99-1882), 2000 WL 34013891 (presenting the question of
whether the clear and convincing evidence standard applied to the defense of obviousness-
type double patenting).
144 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S.
91 (2011) (No. 10-290), 2010 WL 3413088 (Tom Hungar).
145 i4i, 564 U.S. at 95.
146 Timothy B. Dyk, Thoughts on the Relationship Between the Supreme Court and the Federal
Circuit, 16 CHI.-KENT. J. INTELL. PROP. 67, 72 (2016) (reporting that the Supreme Court
reversed or vacated seventy percent of Federal Circuit decisions reviewed on the merits
from OT2006 through OT2015).
147 See, e.g., Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, 16, Excel Commc’ns, Inc. v. AT&T
Corp., 528 U.S. 946 (1999) (mem.) (No. 99-95), 1999 WL 33640012.
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raise an eligibility argument148 and over the Solicitor General’s recommen-
dation to deny.149  (The SG was ultimately vindicated when the Court dis-
missed the petition as improvidently granted.)150
In addition, although the Court has frequently passed on issues that it
ultimately reviewed at the urging of an elite lawyer, the Court has in other
circumstances quickly granted somewhat esoteric issues pressed by elite law-
yers in the first instance.  For example, in a span of eighteen months from
2016 to 2018, the Court granted cert in two cases involving patent infringe-
ment under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)—a relatively obscure provision making it ille-
gal to sell components of patented inventions to be assembled outside the
United States.151  Petitioner’s counsel of record in both cases qualified as
elite.152
There are, to be sure, other case examples suggesting that elite lawyer-
ing is not as important as my analysis indicates.  For instance, in the 2016
Term, the Court in Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC
granted a cert petition, filed by a lawyer who did not qualify as elite, challeng-
ing the constitutionality of the new postissuance review proceedings created
by the America Invents Act153—and that was after denying a petition present-
ing the same issue filed by a lawyer who plainly qualifies as elite154 and who
wrangled significant amicus support.155  Similarly, in 2005, the Court granted
certiorari in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., on a petition filed by a law-
148 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs.,
Inc., 548 U.S. 124 (2006) (mem.) (per curiam) (No. 04-607), 2004 WL 2505526 (Jonathan
Franklin).
149 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 1, Lab. Corp., 548 U.S. 124 (No.
04-607), 2005 WL 2072283.
150 Lab. Corp., 548 U.S. at 125.
151 WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 138 S. Ct. 2129, 2136 (2018); Life
Techs. Corp. v. Promega Corp., 137 S. Ct. 734, 737 (2017).
152 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, WesternGeco, 138 S. Ct. 2129 (No. 16-1011), 2017
WL 678358 (Paul Clement); Petition for a Writ of Ceriorari, Life Techs., 137 S. Ct. 734 (No.
14-1538), 2015 WL 3941490 (Carter Phillips).  For another relatively recent Supreme
Court case on § 271(f) in which the petition was, again, filed by an elite lawyer, see
Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 441 (2007); and see also Petition for a Writ
of Certiorari, AT&T, 550 U.S. 437 (No. 05-1056), 2006 WL 403897 (Ted Olson).  Cases
arising under § 271(f), it should be noted, almost inevitably involve the potential for extra-
territorial application of a federal statute—an issue that might capture the Court’s atten-
tion regardless of the underlying area of substantive law. Cf. Narechania, supra note 9, at
1376–80 (documenting the Supreme Court’s proclivity to grant cert when “a patent-spe-
cific rule stands at odds with the approach employed in nearly every other substantive
field,” citing AT&T as an example).
153 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s
Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018) (No. 16-712), 2016 WL 6995217 (Allyson Ho); see
also Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1370 (holding that the proceedings violate neither Article III
nor the Seventh Amendment).
154 See MCM Portfolio LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 137 S. Ct 292 (2016) (mem.) (deny-
ing cert); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, MCM Portfolio 137 S. Ct. 292 (No 15-1330),
2016 WL 1729988 (Tom Goldstein).
155 Eight cert-stage amicus briefs were filed in the MCM Portfolio case.
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yer who did not qualify as elite, to review the “teaching, suggestion, or moti-
vation” requirement adopted by the Federal Circuit for proving
obviousness156—an issue that had been presented in cert petitions several
times previously (though not, as far as I can tell, by an elite lawyer).157
That said, even in cases such as Oil States and KSR, traces of elite lawyer
effects can be found.  Most notably, the counsel of record in both cases had
previously argued before the Court—just not frequently enough to qualify as
elite under the definition I use in this Article.158  Both petitions also featured
former Supreme Court clerks on their covers.159  Moreover, the petition in
KSR enjoyed significant amicus support: three amicus briefs were filed at the
cert stage—a fact that, as discussed above, correlates with a grant rate that is
four to five times greater than average.160
In future work, I plan to at least partially untangle these causal threads
by coding the roughly six hundred Federal Circuit cert petitions in my
dataset for the substantive question presented.  This will allow for more sys-
tematic examination of the various questions presented to the Supreme
Court and help in isolating the impact of elite lawyers.  I also intend to code
the petitions for other information that is potentially relevant to the
Supreme Court’s decision to grant or deny cert, such as the mode of disposi-
tion in the Federal Circuit (precedential opinion, nonprecedential opinion,
or affirmance without opinion under Federal Circuit Rule 36),161 whether
there were separate opinions (concurrences or dissents) at the Federal Cir-
cuit,162 and the date of the conference at which the Supreme Court consid-
ered the petition.163  Finally, I intend to create a more granular metric of
156 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398
(2007) (No. 04-1350), 2005 WL 835463 (James Dabney); see also KSR, 550 U.S. at 407
(rejecting the Federal Circuit’s caselaw).
157 See, e.g., Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, 13, Medinol Ltd. v. Johnson & Johnson,
543 U.S. 814 (2004) (mem.) (No. 03-1590), 2004 WL 1174638; Petition for a Writ of Certi-
orari at i, 2, S. Cal. Edison Co. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 532 U.S. 974 (2001) (mem.) (No. 00-
1426), 2001 WL 34124948.
158 See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1202 (2015) (Ho); M&G
Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 135 S. Ct. 926, 930 (2015) (Ho); Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vor-
nado Air Circulation Sys., 535 U.S. 826, 827 (2002) (Dabney).
159 Allyson Ho, counsel of record in Oil States, was a clerk to Justice O’Connor.  And the
petition in KSR included as counsel John Duffy, a former clerk to Justice Scalia.
160 See supra Table 3 (reporting a 29.4% grant rate for patent cases in which three
amicus briefs were filed at the cert stage, as compared to a 6.6% grant rate in patent cases
overall).
161 See Paul R. Gugliuzza & Mark A. Lemley, Can a Court Change the Law by Saying Noth-
ing?, 71 VAND. L. REV. 765, 767–68 (2018) (observing that the Federal Circuit could use
Rule 36 to detract attention from particular decisions).
162 See, e.g., Duffy, supra note 4, at 318–19 (suggesting that the Federal Circuit’s divided
en banc vote in Warner-Jenkinson and the accompanying opinions “signaled the importance
of the case to the [Supreme] Court” and “also provided a menu of alternative positions”).
163 See Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Calendar of the Justices:
How the Supreme Court’s Timing Affects Its Decisionmaking, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 183, 204 (2004)
(finding that the Court grants a higher percentage of cert petitions in October (after the
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each lawyer’s experience before the Supreme Court, taking into account fac-
tors such as the number of arguments the lawyer has presented before the
Court (as the discussion of Oil States and KSR indicates, even one prior argu-
ment probably has a positive effect on the lawyer’s ability to obtain cert),
whether the lawyer is a former Supreme Court clerk, and whether the lawyer
formerly worked in the Solicitor General’s office.  All of those data points will
shed light on the question of whether it is particular lawyers who are driving
the Supreme Court’s interest in patent law, turning relatively mundane cases
into Supreme Court blockbusters, or whether seasoned Supreme Court advo-
cates are simply ending up on cases that are already strong candidates for
cert.
Despite the work that remains to be done, this Article’s analysis still sig-
nificantly advances our understanding of the agenda-setting process in
Supreme Court patent cases.  To recap, its main findings are as follows: First,
the Supreme Court is increasingly inclined to grant cert in patent cases as
compared to all types of cases and as compared to the Court’s historical prac-
tice in patent cases.  Second, at the same time the Court has become more
inclined to grant cert in patent cases, elite advocates have become more
involved in patent litigation at the cert stage.  Third, in patent cases, the
Court is far more likely to grant a cert petition filed by an elite advocate as
compared to the average petition.  Finally, factors strongly correlated with
the likelihood of a cert grant in all types of cases, such as orders calling for
the views of the Solicitor General and a large number of cert-stage amicus
briefs, appear to play an outsized role in patent cases.
The elite bar’s remarkable success at obtaining cert in patent cases, cou-
pled with the seeming importance of the Solicitor General’s views and the
number of amicus briefs, suggests that the Court relies heavily on heuristics
in deciding whether to grant cert in a patent dispute.164  This is perhaps to
be expected given that patent law can be complex and unfamiliar to the law
clerks who sift through cert petitions, particularly when coupled with the lack
of circuit splits.  But the reliance on heuristics raises the risk that the patent
cases decided by the Supreme Court—though substantial in number—will
not involve the issues of legal doctrine on which Supreme Court input would
be most useful.  I noted above the two decisions in two years on § 271(f)—a
statutory provision implicated in only a fraction of patent infringement cases.
Likewise, numerous commentators have criticized the Court’s recent deci-
sions on patent-eligible subject matter under § 101 of the Patent Act, arguing
that the Court has improperly imported into that doctrine considerations of
inventiveness and patent scope that are already addressed by § 102’s novelty
requirement, § 103’s nonobviousness requirement, and § 112’s disclosure
Court disposes of the large number of petitions that have accumulated during the summer
recess), November, January, and June).
164 For a more in-depth discussion of the indices, signals, and cues the Court uses to
cope with its enormous cert-stage workload, see PERRY, supra note 21, 113–39.
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requirements.165  Yet the Court has heard more cases on eligibility in the past
decade (four)166 than it has on all of those other patentability requirements
combined (two).167  Why the fixation on eligibility?  One possibility is that
eligibility disputes are magnets for amicus briefs: eligibility cases represent
four of the nine patent cases with the most cert-stage amicus briefs filed in
my dataset.168
All that said, the increasing involvement of the elite Supreme Court bar
in patent litigation is not necessarily a bad thing.  In recent decades, a large
amount of patent scholarship has criticized the work of the Federal Circuit,
contending that the court has succumbed to pathologies, such as capture
and tunnel vision, often associated with specialized courts.169  Because the
lawyers who comprise the elite Supreme Court bar are not patent law special-
ists, they could counteract any tendency by the Federal Circuit to favor paten-
tees and to encourage patent litigation.170  Moreover, because Supreme
Court patent cases often involve elite lawyers on both sides,171 the quality of
advocacy should be high and enable the Court to make well-informed deci-
sions in what can sometimes be a complex and arcane area of law.  In the
165 For a summary of those critiques, see John M. Golden, Redundancy: When Law
Repeats Itself, 94 TEX. L. REV. 629, 703 (2016).  For the record, in prior work, I have chal-
lenged the notion that the Supreme Court’s reinvigoration of the eligibility requirement is
a negative development. See Paul R. Gugliuzza, Quick Decisions in Patent Cases, 106 GEO. L.J.
619, 655 (2018).
166 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2352 (2014); Ass’n for Molecular
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 580 (2013); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72 (2012); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 599–601
(2010).
167 Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 628, 630 (2019)
(§ 102); Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014) (§ 112).  The
Court’s last § 103 decision was in 2007, see KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S.
398, 407 (2007), despite numerous intervening Federal Circuit decisions that appear to be
in tension with Supreme Court caselaw. See Paul R. Gugliuzza, How Much Has the Supreme
Court Changed Patent Law?, 16 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 330, 346–47 (2017) (citing
examples).
168 Specifically, seven cert-stage amicus briefs were filed in Myriad, nine in Bilski, and
eleven in Alice.  This Article’s analysis of the importance of amicus briefs makes it all the
more remarkable that the Court denied cert—without even calling for the views of the
Solicitor General—in Sequenom, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 2511 (2016)
(mem.), a case in which twenty-two cert-stage amicus briefs were filed—the most of any
patent case in my dataset by far. See supra Table 3.
169 See, e.g., J. Jonas Anderson, Patent Dialogue, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1049, 1097 (2014);
Michael J. Burstein, Rules for Patents, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1747, 1797 (2011); Nard &
Duffy, supra note 7, at 1622; Rai, supra note 7, at 1099.
170 See generally Paul R. Gugliuzza, Saving the Federal Circuit, 13 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL.
PROP. 350, 373–74 (2014) (discussing the possibility of interest group capture of the Fed-
eral Circuit and contending that the court is not necessarily “pro-patent,” as critics often
suggest, but “pro-patent lawyer” because it shapes patent doctrine to encourage companies
to actively obtain patents and to encourage both plaintiffs and defendants to vigorously
litigate infringement disputes).
171 See supra Table 7.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-3\NDL306.txt unknown Seq: 45  6-MAR-20 10:43
2020] the  supreme  court  bar  at  the  bar  of  patents 1277
end, because the elite bar’s involvement in patent litigation is a relatively
recent development, it may be too early to decide whether it is to be
lamented or praised.172
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s return to the bar of patents is one of the most
significant events in intellectual property law in the past two decades.  This
Article has linked that development to the activity of a small group of lawyers
working at the country’s most prestigious law firms.  At present, the elite
bar’s dominance of Supreme Court litigation shows no sign of abating.173
And so the Supreme Court has, in all likelihood, not only returned to the bar
of patents—it has pulled up a chair.
172 In a companion piece to this Article, prepared for a law review symposium on
Administering Patent Law, I explore in more detail the normative implications of having a
small, relatively homogeneous group of lawyers play such a large role in shaping patent
doctrine. See Paul R. Gugliuzza, Elite Patent Law, Essay, 104 IOWA L. REV. 2481, 2497–2507
(2019).  I also present the results of an empirical study showing that elite Supreme Court
lawyers are increasingly involved in patent cases at the Federal Circuit level, too, casting
doubt on the conventional wisdom that the practice of patent law is limited to specialized
lawyers with backgrounds in the hard sciences. See id. at 2491–97.
173 See Jacqueline Bell, The Firms That Won Big at the Supreme Court, LAW360 (July 1,
2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1057730/the-firms-that-won-big-at-the-supreme-
court (noting that lawyers from eight different law firms argued three or more Supreme
Court cases in the 2017 Term).
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APPENDIX
TABLE A1: PAID CERT PETITIONS IN FEDERAL CIRCUIT CASES,
PATENT VERSUS NONPATENT, OT2002 THROUGH
OT2016 (INCLUDING GVR’D CASES)
Term Patent Nonpatent Total % Patent % Nonpatent 
2002 37 40 77 48.1% 51.9% 
2003 33 46 79 41.8% 58.2% 
2004 30 44 74 40.5% 59.5% 
2005 31 36 67 46.3% 53.7% 
2006 36 46 82 43.9% 56.1% 
2007 46 39 85 54.1% 45.9% 
2008 49 33 82 59.8% 40.2% 
2009 27 42 69 39.1% 60.9% 
2010 33 34 67 49.3% 50.7% 
2011 27 32 59 45.8% 54.2% 
2012 39 25 64 60.9% 39.1% 
2013 48 33 81 59.3% 40.7% 
2014 49 40 89 55.1% 44.9% 
2015 67 28 95 70.5% 29.5% 
2016 65 33 98 66.3% 33.7% 
Total 617 551 1168 52.8% 47.2% 
TABLE A2: CERT-STAGE AMICUS BRIEFS FILED IN ALL SUPREME COURT CASES
(PAID PETITIONS ONLY), OT2002
Amicus Briefs Filed Total Denied Granted % Granted 
0 1595 1554 41 2.6% 
1 93 79 14 15.1% 
2 24 17 7 29.2% 
3 14 10 4 28.6% 
4 10 5 5 50.0% 
5 4 2 2 50.0% 
6 1 1 0 0.0% 
8 1 1 0 0.0% 
9 1 0 1 100.0% 
     
0 or 1 1718 1663 55 3.2% 
2 to 4 48 32 16 33.3% 
5 or more 7 4 3 42.9% 
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TABLE A3: CERT-STAGE AMICUS BRIEFS FILED IN ALL SUPREME COURT CASES
(PAID PETITIONS ONLY), OT2010
Amicus Briefs Filed Total Denied Granted % Granted 
0 1305 1277 28 2.1% 
1 87 72 15 17.2% 
2 34 29 5 14.7% 
3 28 23 5 17.9% 
4 7 5 2 28.6% 
5 7 5 2 28.6% 
6 2 2 0 0.0% 
7 3 3 0 0.0% 
9 1 0 1 100.0% 
10 1 1 0 0.0% 
11 1 0 1 100.0% 
14 1 0 1 100.0% 
     
0 or 1 1392 1349 43 3.1% 
2 to 4 69 57 12 17.4% 
5 or more 16 11 5 31.3% 
TABLE A4: CERT-STAGE AMICUS BRIEFS FILED IN ALL SUPREME COURT CASES
(PAID PETITIONS ONLY), OT2016
Amicus Briefs Filed Total Denied Granted % Granted 
0 1290 1262 28 2.2% 
1 115 99 16 13.9% 
2 54 45 9 16.7% 
3 31 28 3 9.7% 
4 21 15 6 28.6% 
5 7 4 3 42.9% 
6 3 3 0 0.0% 
7 6 4 2 33.3% 
8 4 2 2 50.0% 
9 1 1 0 0.0% 
10 1 0 1 100.0% 
14 1 0 1 100.0% 
     
0 or 1 1405 1361 44 3.1% 
2 to 4 106 88 18 17.1% 
5 or more 23 14 9 39.1% 
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